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On May 22, 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Weapons Systems 
Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA). The intent of this law is to reform acquisition 
processes, control unsustainable cost growth, and make programs more affordable. In 
2010, despite WSARA, program cost, schedule overruns, and less-than-desirable 
performance were still prevalent in DoD acquisition.  
In response, Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]), issued his Better Buying Power (BBP) 
memorandum directing the implementation of Should-Cost Management (SCM). In April 
2011, Carter issued an additional directive that should-cost estimates would be required 
for all acquisition category (ACAT) programs and that SCM initiative progress would be 
briefed at every milestone review. In November 2012, Frank Kendall, Carter’s successor, 
issued an update to the original BBP initiative (BBPi), reinforcing the success of the 
BBPi. Kendall’s update incorporated lessons learned from two years of implementation 
and feedback from the acquisition workforce.  
Our case study examines how the Army has implemented SCM as part of the 
BBPi. We analyze actions taken from the program manager to the Army acquisition 
executive using Program Executive Office (PEO) Aviation as our case study focus.  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Acquisition reform has been an elusive goal for the Department of Defense 
(DoD). Congress and the DoD have tried many different acquisition reform efforts, yet 
many programs are still failing to meet cost, schedule, and performance goals. On May 
22, 2009, President Barack Obama signed the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act 
(WSARA) of 2009. The act was created to reform the DoD acquisition process with the 
intent to control unsustainable costs and make programs more affordable. The act was 
also a response to unsustainable cost growth across multiple major defense acquisition 
programs (MDAPs). 
On March 3, 2009, Senator Carl Levin addressed the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, stating, “Overall, DoD’s 95 defense MDAPs have exceeded their research 
and development budgets by 40%, seen their acquisition costs grow by an average of 
26%, and experienced an average schedule delay of two years” (Acquisition of Major 
Weapons Systems, 2009, p. 2). Unrealistic cost and performance estimates across all 
services were cited as the main reasons for the cost and schedule delays. The WSARA of 
2009 directed that the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) be 
created as an independent cost estimation agency for the Secretary of Defense to fix the 
deficiencies in the cost estimation process (Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009). The OSD CAPE is required to provide an independent cost estimate (ICE) for all 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs.  
Program cost, schedule overruns, and less than advertised performance were still 
systemic in 2010 despite the WSARA. How could DoD acquisition leadership control 
unsustainable program costs to increase program affordability? What management 
practices could they apply to its cost problem? In response to continued unsustainable 
program, acquisition, and contract costs on most major weapons systems in the DoD, 
Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 
(USD[AT&L]), issued a memorandum to all acquisition professionals on September 14, 
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2010, titled Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending. Carter’s memo directed the implementation of Should-
Cost Management (SCM) as part of the larger Better Buying Power initiative (BBPi) for 
the DoD to ensure that program managers (PM) incorporated productivity improvements 
into programs in contract negotiations and program execution (Carter, 2010b). 
In April 2011, Carter (2011a) provided an additional directive that should-cost 
estimates would be required by all ACAT programs. Should-cost initiative progress was 
required to be briefed as part of every milestone review. Additionally, the directive 
prescribed PMs to develop, own, track, and report should-cost estimates annually. 
Furthermore, service acquisition executives would track and report their should-cost 
savings to their Service’s Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller 
to be validated. This is consistent with Carter’s message to the acquisition workforce, 
“We must do more without more” (Carter, 2010b, p. 1), and SCM is a technique for 
attaining the set goals. 
In November 2012, Frank Kendall, the new USD(AT&L), issued an update to the 
original BBPi titled Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending. Kendall (2012) introduced his updated 
guidance to reinforce the success of the BBPi through a modification of the original 23 
initiatives into 36 initiatives organized into seven focus areas. The changes were made 
based on lessons learned from two years of initial implementation and feedback from the 
acquisition workforce. The basic goal of BBP 2.0 remains unchanged from the original 
BBP guidance to “deliver better value to the taxpayer and Warfighter by improving the 
way the Department does business” (Kendall, 2012, p. 1). The BBPi as well as SCM are a 
management philosophy and culture change for the acquisition workforce.  
B. RESEARCH PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to conduct a case study analysis of how the Army 
has implemented Carter’s (2011a) should-cost initiative issued on April 22, 2011, titled 
Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management and Frank Kendall’s (2013b) 
follow-on guidance titled Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 2.0—
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Achieving Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending. The case study 
examines the should-cost process across various leadership levels, including the Army 
acquisition executive (AAE), a selected Army program executive officer (PEO), PEO 
Aviation, and the PEO’s PM offices. We specifically analyze Army and PEO leadership 
directives, program manager execution practices, and metrics and reporting directives 
back to Army leadership and milestone decision authorities. The overarching goals of the 
project are to identify how SCM is being implemented, identify any best practices that 
can be promulgated to the acquisition community, and make recommendations on how to 
improve the SCM process. Our case study objectives are to report on SCM progress made 
to date and the best practices that can be promulgated to the rest of the acquisition corps. 
The DoD has mandated the use of SCM as part of its BBPi. SCM is a 
fundamental change in the way program offices do business and asks PMs to look at cost 
estimates differently. PMs executing SCM take the independent cost estimate (ICE), or 
“will-cost,” and drive down the cost of their program to the “should-cost” estimate 
through various management methods. It has been three years since the implementation 
of SCM, and an analysis of the progress made to date is warranted. We identify what 
guidance has been given to Army PMs, what techniques are being used to reach should-
cost estimates, and how PMs are reporting their progress back to Army leadership and 
Milestone Decision Authorities (MDAs). 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The BBPi and SCM have been in effect for more than three years now. Little 
research and few case studies have been undertaken to analyze the effect of 
implementation of SCM and the BBPi. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) has 
started to build a should-cost body of knowledge and best practices, which is still a work 
in progress. The results of this case study will be added to the DAU body of knowledge 
and other lessons learned repositories to provide the acquisition workforce with should-
cost best practices and continuous process improvement techniques. It is Army policy for 
all ACAT programs to have MDA-approved should-cost targets by January 1, 2012 
(Shyu, 2011). The effects of this policy are unknown due to limited data available during 
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our literature review research. We anticipate this project will add to the conversation and 
collaboration of SCM best practices in the Army acquisition community. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Our primary research question addressed in this paper is as follows: Using PEO 
Aviation as the case study focus, how has the Army implemented SCM as directed by 
BBP 1.0 and 2.0? From this question, the following secondary questions aid in answering 
the primary research question: 
• What are the directives related to SCM from the BBPi from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Army, and PEO? 
• What is the organizational process for SCM in the Army? 
• What are the best should-cost practices to promulgate to the acquisition 
workforce? 
E. SHOULD-COST OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
1. Should-cost and Will-cost Defined by the Better Buying Power 
Initiative 
The definitions of should-cost and will-cost in the BBPi are important for 
understanding the concepts used throughout this case study. SCM is not a new concept to 
the acquisition community. Should-cost definitions have been redefined and expanded in 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 15.407-4 and the United States Army 
Materiel Command’s (United States Army Materiel Command [AMC], 1972) pamphlet, 
Procurement: Should-Cost Analysis Guide. Understanding the differences between the 
multiple variations of should-cost is critical to implementing the BBP version of should-
cost. The BBPi defines will-cost and should-cost as follows: 
• Will-cost is the ICE or program estimates and other cost projections funded in 
the budget (Carter, 2011b).  
• Should-cost is defined as what the system should cost after the PM develops 
and implements a holistic lifecycle plan for achieving cost savings below the 
ICE or will-cost estimate. According to Kendall (2012), “should-cost is the 
concept that our managers should set cost targets below independent cost 
estimates and manage with the intent to achieve them” (p. 3). 
SCM is both a philosophy and a management system to scrutinize program costs 
during each phase of a product’s lifecycle. In addition, it is a continuous improvement 
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process to lower costs without sacrificing quality and performance or damaging 
contractor relations. Additionally, should-cost is comparable to Lean Manufacturing in 
that its goal is to eliminate waste and non-value-added processes in the product’s 
lifecycle. In short, SCM is essentially a contract between the American taxpayer and the 
product/project/program management office (PMO) to cut costs and make programs 
affordable. Carter (2010b) directed all PMs to 
conduct a Should-Cost analysis justifying each element of program 
cost and showing how it is improving year by year or meeting other 
relevant benchmarks for value. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense 
will continue to set the program budget baseline (used also in 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADMs) and Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs)) using an ICE. (p. 3) 
The BBP and should-cost directives are to be used as a guide, and execution of 
the initiative is expected to vary by program, depending on its lifecycle stage. 
2. SHOULD-COST HISTORY 
The United States military has experienced cyclical periods of war and peace 
since its founding. Periods of war, mobilization, and rapid procurement are typically 
followed by precipitous peacetime declines in military spending. The United States is 
currently in a downward trend of defense spending following the end of combat in Iraq, 
the planned withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan in 2014, and the ongoing 
recovery from a global recession. The United States was in a similar situation financially 
and militarily at the end of the Vietnam War in the early 1970s. The Vietnam War was 
coming to a close, and military budgets were being reduced to typical peacetime levels. 
In the 1970s, inflation and the cost of new technology were making defense programs 
unaffordable. Meanwhile, the American people did not have an appetite for defense 
spending and voted to focus more on domestic issues. The DoD developed SCM 
practices to become better stewards of taxpayer money to combat these realities. 
In May 1972, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) published the AMC Pamphlet 
(AMCP), Procurement: Should-Cost Analysis Guide. The guidebook is advisory in nature 
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and is intended to be used by acquisition practitioners to accomplish should-cost analysis. 
Should-cost is defined by the AMCP 715-7 as 
an approach to cost analysis through fully coordinated efforts of a 
team of Government specialists in engineering, pricing, audit, 
procurement, and management. The specialists review in detail the 
contractor’s engineering and manufacturing operations, accounting 
procedures, cost estimating systems, purchasing procedures, make-or-
buy decisions, organizational structure, and any other elements of cost 
and management control required for contract performance. The 
analysis is used to identify uneconomical or inefficient practices in the 
contractor’s operation, and to formulate the Government’s negotiation 
position, on the basis of the team’s estimate of what the contract 
should cost to perform, based on reasonably achievable economies and 
efficiencies. (p. 1-1) 
This AMCP version of should-cost is similar to traditional cost analysis but 
differs in two ways: the depth and scope of analysis, and the level to which the 
government challenges contractor inefficiencies through onsite inspections. 
Should-cost is not a new concept to the acquisition or commercial business 
community. According to Naval Postgraduate Graduate School Senior Lecturer Elliott 
Cory Yoder, “Should-cost will-cost is not a new concept. As early as the mid-1950s, 
should-cost analysis was proposed as a means to get better, more accurate estimates on 
what systems ought to cost, versus what they will cost based on historical data that may 
have included numerous inefficiencies in production and management” (2012, p. 5). 
SCM is a common sense approach to getting a product for what it really should cost 
versus what it was estimated to cost. However, according to Yoder (2012), the name 
should-cost has led to confusion because the should-cost methodology in the BBPi is 
different in scope from previous versions of should-cost. Therefore, Yoder recommends a 
name change for the BBPi’s should-cost to differentiate between the FAR’s definition of 
should-cost and the BBPi’s version.  
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we gave an introduction to and background of SCM. In the 
introduction section, we gave an overview of SCM as a component of the larger BBPi, 
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the purpose of this project, and the primary question and supporting questions that this 
project intends to answer. Additionally, we explained the significance of the project. In 
the background section, we gave a definition of should-cost and will-cost from the BBP 
definition. The definition is important to understand because the BBPi should-cost is 
different and larger in scope than previous versions of should-cost that are in the FAR. 
Finally, we discussed should-cost history. SCM means different things to different 
people. It is important for readers of this research to understand the difference between 
the variations of should-cost. 
In the next chapter we conduct an extensive literature review to analyze all 
previously published BBPi and SCM guidance and research found through open sources. 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 8 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Carter’s BBPi is an aggressive endeavor to improve the DoD’s acquisition 
process by reducing redundancy and waste, streamlining processes, improving efficiency, 
and educating its workforce with the aim of saving billions of taxpayer dollars. The focus 
of this literature review is to provide a comprehensive look at all major memoranda, 
directives, and policy letters pertaining to Carter’s BBPi, from genesis to its current state, 
and more specifically, the implementation guidance for the SCM section of the BBPi. 
This literature review provides the foundational information for our project, which is to 
analyze Army leadership directives, PM execution practices, and reporting requirements 
relating to the SCM aspect of BBP. 
A. BETTER BUYING POWER LITERATURE 
This section highlights all documents related to the implementation of Carter’s 
BBPi. The directives began in June 2010, with the release of the first document 
pertaining to the new cost-saving initiative. The documents are listed in chronological 
order to show the building of implementation guidance over time. 
1. Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (June 28, 2010) 
This memorandum from Ashton Carter, the former USD(AT&L), outlined his 
preliminary guidance on how to (1) deliver the warfighting capability we need for the 
dollars we have, (2) get better buying power for our warfighters and taxpayers, (3) restore 
affordability to defense goods and services, (4) improve defense industry productivity, 
(5) remove government impediments to leanness, (6) avoid program turbulence, and (7) 
maintain a vibrant and financially healthy defense industry (Carter, 2010a). This memo is 
the genesis of the BBPi and was promulgated to the entire acquisition workforce. The 
memo was prompted by former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ speech at the 
Eisenhower Library on May 8, 2010. In his speech, Gates (2010) stated that the Defense 
Department must be “respectful of the American taxpayer at a time of economic and 
fiscal distress” (p. 1).  
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The memo stated that after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, DoD 
spending increased dramatically and was focused primarily on providing warfighting 
capabilities quickly. As a result, during the course of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), 
acquisition inefficiencies mounted. The memo further stated that despite the fact that the 
budget for defense would cease to grow, the DoD would continue to grow its force 
structure and increase its modernization efforts at a rate of 3% annually. To compensate 
for these intended actions, the Department would need to cut its budget in other areas. 
According to the memo, the initial goal was to save $100 billion over a five-year period, 
with the bulk of those savings coming from the BBPi. The memo was accompanied by a 
department-level briefing that discussed BBP and laid the foundation for the follow-on 
memo, which included a roadmap and a more refined BBP briefing. This follow-on 
memo, which was released to the acquisition workforce on September 14, was titled 
Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in 
Defense Spending (Carter, 2010b). 
2. Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining Greater Efficiency and 
Productivity in Defense Spending (September 14, 2010) 
This memo from the USD(AT&L) is the follow-on to the memo promulgated to 
the acquisition workforce on June 28, 2010, mandating better value for taxpayers and 
warfighters alike by improving defense acquisition. In this memo, Carter (2010b) stated, 
We have a continuing responsibility to procure the critical goods and 
services our forces need in the years ahead, but we will not have ever-
increasing budgets to pay for them. We must therefore strive to 
achieve what economists call productivity growth: in simple terms, to 
“DO MORE WITHOUT MORE.” (p. 1) 
The memo provides specific guidance to acquisition professionals on how to 
achieve better efficiencies. Carter (2010b) provided 23 points that were geared towards 
improving efficiencies and organized into five major categories: Target Affordability and 
Control Cost Growth, Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry, Promote Real 
Competition, Improve Tradecraft in Services Acquisition, and Reduce Non-productive 
Processes. Of the five categories, the first one, titled Target Affordability and Control 
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Cost Growth, is directly related to this MBA project; one of its subcategories is to drive 
productivity growth through Will Cost/Should Cost management. The memo states, 
During contract negotiations and program execution, our managers 
should be driving productivity improvement in their programs. They 
should be scrutinizing every element of program cost, assessing 
whether each element can be reduced relative to the year before, 
challenging learning curves, dissecting overheads and indirect costs, 
and targeting cost reduction with profit incentive—in short, executing 
to what the program should cost. (Carter, 2010b, p. 3) 
In this subcategory,Carter further stated, 
I will require the manager of each major program to conduct a Should 
Cost analysis justifying each element of program cost and showing 
how it is improving year by year or meeting other relevant benchmarks 
for value. Meanwhile, the Department will continue to set the program 
budget baseline using an independent cost estimate (ICE). (Carter, 
2010b, p. 3) 
According to the memo, the acquisition community comprised of senior 
logisticians, systems command leaders, OSD staff, component acquisition executives 
(CAE), PEOs, and PMs, worked collectively to build the “Guidance Roadmap” (Carter, 
2010b), which summarizes the 23 principal points. The Guidance Roadmap (Figure 1) 
was issued along with this memo. Carter’s (2010b) guidance contained in this memo and 
roadmap was to affect approximately 60% of the $700 billion defense budget—roughly 
$400 billion dollars—and was expected to save $100 billion over the following five 
years. Carter (2010b) stated, 
Those who hesitate to go down the road of greater efficiency must 
consider the alternative: broken or canceled programs, budget 
turbulence, uncertainty and unpredictability for industry, erosion of 
taxpayer confidence that they are getting value for their defense dollars 





 Guidance Roadmap (from Carter, 2010b) Figure 1. 
3. Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power: Obtaining 
Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (November 
3, 2010) 
In this memo, Carter (2010c) provided specific implementation directives to the 
military departments (MILDEPs) and defense agency directors for each of the five 
 12 
categories specified in his previous memo dated September 14, 2010: Target 
Affordability and Control Cost Growth, Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in 
Industry, Promote Real Competition, Improve Tradecraft in Services Acquisition, and 
Reduce Non-productive Processes. In the memo (as it pertains to this research), he 
mandated affordability-based decision-making at milestone decision points for all ACAT 
I programs. 
In addition, Carter (2010c) directed all MILDEPs and directors of defense 
agencies to establish should-cost targets for all ACAT I programs for consideration in 
major milestone decisions “using sound estimating techniques that are based on bottom-
up assessments of what programs should cost, if reasonable efficiency and productivity 
enhancing efforts are undertaken” (Carter, 2010c, p. 2). These costs would be the basis 
for contract negotiations and incentives and would be used to track contractor and 
PEO/PM performance. Carter further directed that PEO/PMs would use SCM to establish 
estimates for ACAT II and III component milestone decisions and use this management 
technique to track all ACAT II and III programs. The memo also directed a bottom-up 
review of all internally generated reporting requirements to better streamline reporting 
and eliminate up to 50% of redundant reporting requirements and shorten the remaining 
ones (Carter, 2010c). 
4. Better Buying Power: An Army Program Manager’s Perspective 
(Thesis, May 2012) 
In this May 2012 Senior Service College Fellowship study, Patrick J. Layden 
looked at Carter’s BBPi and Guidance Roadmap from the perspective of the PMs and 
attempted to gather feedback on how to improve the program’s overall guidance and 
implementation. The significance of this study is that BBP is a relatively new concept 
that places the bulk of the responsibility for implementation on the shoulders of the PMs. 
Although there have been numerous documents promulgated to the workforce, there has 
been very little research conducted on this topic to measure program effectiveness and 
discover gaps in implementation (Layden, 2012). This assertion made by the author of 
this report two years after Carter’s BBPi was first released is significantly important and 
is the reason why this particular literature is relevant to our research on Army SCM.  
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Layden’s (2012) study investigated PMs’ understanding of the various aspects of 
the BBPi and also their perspectives on the initiative’s potential impacts on their 
respective programs. Layden attempted to provide a progress report on the initiative and 
at a minimum open up discussion on how to make improvements to the program. An 
applied research methodology was used to collect data for this project. Quantitative data 
was collected from O-6 (colonel)–level PMs and deputy PMs in the following Army and 
Joint PEOs: 
• PEO Aviation 
• PEO Ammunition 
• PEO Combat Support and Combat Service Support 
• PEO Command, Control and Communications-Tactical 
• PEO Ground Combat Systems 
• PEO Intelligence, Electronic Warfare and Sensors 
• PEO Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation 
• JPEO Chemical and Biological Defense 
The researcher attempted to answer the following questions: 
1) Are the PMs familiar with the BBP initiative, and are the initiatives impacting 
their programs? 
2). Do Army PMs believe there is enough formal direction and practice to 
properly implement all elements of the BBP initiative on their programs, or do 
they feel they need additional support (i.e., guidance, tools, and training)?  
3) What elements of the BBP initiative do Army PMs believe can meet the cost 
savings objectives (Layden, 2012, p. 7).  
4) There are three hypotheses in this study: 
5) The majority of Army PMs are only somewhat familiar with BBP, and the 
initiatives are having a minimal impact on their programs.  
6) The majority of Army PMs believe there is not enough formal direction and 
practice to effectively implement several aspects of the BBP initiatives and 
require additional guidance, training, and tools.  
7) A majority of Army PMs believe only a few of the BBP initiatives can 
produce significant cost savings (Layden, 2012, p. 7-8).  
Layden (2012) concluded that the first hypothesis was correct. PMs were only 
generally familiar with the various initiatives for BBP and they felt the initiatives “are not 
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having a very significant impact on current programs” (Layden, 2012, p. 60). Layden 
concluded that the second hypothesis was not true. The data collected in this study 
indicated, “additional guidance, training, and tools are of value, but not substantially so” 
(p. 61). Layden concluded that the third hypothesis was true. The PMs that participated in 
the study rated the cost savings potential to be high.  
Layden (2012) made the following five recommendations to help the BBP 
program achieve its cost saving objectives: 
1) Continually monitor the value of each initiative and make adjustments as 
necessary.  
2) ASA(AL&T) leadership should use the study to formalize Army BBP 
feedback to program leadership and evaluate the potential to improve Army 
implementation.  
3) At milestone B, establish engineering trades, showing how each key design 
feature affects the target cost; enforce open system architectures and set rules 
for acquisition of technical data rights; and help users of services conduct 
market research to support competition and pricing.  
4)  Across the board, acquisition professionals should review this study to 
determine if insight can be gained on specific BBP questions or issues they 
may have  
5)  BBP stakeholders should focus on identifying and taking advantage of the 
most promising cost savings initiatives (p. 63–64). 
Based on the findings of this work, it is clear that more detailed research is needed 
in this area to leverage the work done by Layden and provide further insight into the best 
ways to support the BBPi. The data collected from PMs on their understanding of BBP 
and how they perceive its implementation provide data for our research into the link 
between OSD guidance and implementation by the Army. Layden’s thesis is very 
valuable to our study as it provides us with the research on how each PM interpreted the 
BBPi implementation. 
5. Professional Services Council Recommendation Letter to Under 
Secretary Kendall on Better Buying Power 2.0 Initiative (September 
26, 2012) 
Stan Soloway, president and chief executive officer of Professional Services 
Council (PSC), signed a letter addressed to Kendall on behalf of PSC’s 350-plus member 
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companies. The letter presented three trends that would benefit from additional BBP 
guidance: contract length, buying for value, and squeezing profit to drive cost reductions. 
The letter stressed that the BBPi specified limiting contract lengths to three years 
to encourage competition. The three-year contract limits the company’s ability to realize 
returns on investments unless the investments are made in the first year of the contract. 
Soloway recommended that “BBP stress to DoD components the importance of focusing 
on their requirements and on seeking and rewarding new solutions and innovations” 
(2012, p. 1), thereby establishing quality competitions as opposed to continuous 
competition. 
Soloway addressed squeezing profit to drive cost reductions by stating that profits 
to the manufacturer are not tied to work performed by the manufacturer and the risks it 
assumes. He cited the frequency with which audits are conducted on competitive fixed-
price procurements as a clear example. The recommendation was to remind the force 
what the profit margin awarded to the contractor was supposed to be based upon. 
Establishing a fair profit margin for the contractor would help shield it from various 
initiatives of BBPi seeking cost reductions (Soloway, 2012). 
6. Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for Greater 
Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (November 13, 2012) 
This memo from the USD(AT&L) provided additional guidance to acquisition 
professionals on the BBPi. In this memo, Kendall (2012), who replaced Carter, provided 
36 points that were similar to the original 23 points from BBP 1.0 and laid out the same 
basic goals to “deliver better value to the taxpayer and warfighter by improving the way 
the Department does business” (p. 1). His 36 points, which were organized into seven 
main focus areas, were geared toward improving efficiencies. These focus areas included 
the following: achieve affordable programs, control costs throughout the product 
lifecycle, incentivize productivity and innovation in industry, eliminate unproductive 
processes and bureaucracy, promote effective competition, improve tradecraft in services 
acquisition, and improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce (Kendall, 
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2012). Kendall (2012) emphasized that BBP 2.0 is a management philosophy of 
continually making improvements in the acquisition process.  
The memo was accompanied by an informational briefing sheet titled Better 
Buying Power 2.0 (see Figure 2) and a BBP information paper. The briefing sheet depicts 
seven focus areas with all 36 points on one sheet of paper, and the information paper 
describes each of the 36 points. One of the points, which is directly related to our 
research, is under the focus area of Control costs throughout the product lifecycle and is 
titled Implement “should cost” based management. This point makes the claim that 
“managers should set target costs below independent cost estimates and manage with the 
intent to achieve them” (Kendall, 2012, p. 3). In this area, Kendall asserted that SCM is 
“well on its way to becoming part of the DoD culture” (Kendall, 2012, p. 3). According 
to Layden’s (2012) research, however, it seems PMs are not so sure. Therefore, Kendall’s 
assertion deserves further investigation.  
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 Better Buying Power 2.0 Information Sheet (from Kendall, 2012) Figure 2. 
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7. GAO Report—Defense Management: Opportunities Exist to Improve 
Information Used in Monitoring Status of Efficiency Initiatives 
(December 4, 2012) 
In the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report dated December 4, 2012, 
the primary research question was whether the DoD needed to develop methodologies 
and matrices for reporting efficiency initiatives for all MILDEPs so they could provide 
senior leaders with accurate information. Senior leaders need accurate information to 
monitor progress in achieving programmatic and budgetary goals. This report 
emphasized the need for standardized data collection methods and baseline metrics for 
measuring or quantifying successful implementation of BBPis. 
The GAO was mandated to evaluate the extent of DoD compliance to the 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012, specifically, 
how the DoD has tracked and realized the savings proposed in the initiative to identify a 
minimum of $100 billion in efficiencies during FY 2012–2016 (see Table 1). The DoD 
promulgated its approach for reporting efficiency initiatives to the MILDEPs; however, 
the approach lacks guidance on reporting procedures and methodologies, resulting in 
inaccurate reports. This limits the visibility of senior leaders and hinders their ability to 
monitor progress in achieving programmatic and budgetary goals (GAO, 2012). This 
report addressed the level of compliance by the MILDEPs and the DoD’s progress in 
establishing a department-wide efficiency initiative reporting procedure. 
For both the objectives, the GAO took a sampling of DoD efficiency initiatives 
included within the $100 billion of efficiency initiatives that were identified by MILDEPs 
and used the DoD Efficiency Initiatives Fiscal Year 2012 Budget Estimates justification 
book to choose seven samplings of initiatives to use as case studies—two each from the 
Army, Navy, and Air Force and one from Special Operations Command (SOCOM). To 
make a determination on the extent of compliance to this initiative, the GAO interviewed 
officials and reviewed budget documents and progress reports to identify the processes 
and procedures put in place, if any, to track implementation. The GAO also reviewed 
data maintained in the OSD’s DoD Enterprise Performance Management System 
(DEPMS), electronic spreadsheets on all of the efficiency initiatives, and status update 




Table 1.   Projected Savings Identified by the Military Departments and SOCOM 
Under the Secretary of Defense’s Efficiency Initiative (Fiscal Years 2012 
Through 2016) (from Governemnt Accountability Office, 2012) 
To ensure complete and consistent reporting and improve the DoD’s ability to 
monitor the efficiency initiatives, the GAO recommended that the USD(AT&L) develop 
specific guidance with standardized definitions and methodologies for the MILDEPs and 
SOCOM to use in reporting their efficiency initiatives and actual savings (GAO, 2012). 
For example, an event-driven cost estimate reporting requirement for all ACAT I, II, and 
III programs that includes specific metrics for measuring success of should-cost estimates 
(initial and updated) to compare with will-cost estimates (initial and updated) to quantify 
actual realized savings would greatly improve senior leaders’ ability to make informed 
budgetary and programmatic decisions. This GAO report further reinforces the need for a 
thorough analysis of how the U.S. Army has implemented Carter’s should-cost initiative. 
8. Frank Kendall Letter: To Our Industry Partners (March 4, 2013) 
This letter written by USD(AT&L) Kendall addressed the defense industry 
explaining the rather bleak realities of sequestration and its effects on the industrial base. 
He explained that the DoD will reduce its budget in FY 2013 by $41 billion, which 
includes $18 billion for research and development and production. Kendall (2013a) stated 
that the “sequestration problems are exacerbated by the allocation of funds under the 
current continuing resolution (CR), which provides insufficient dollars in the operating 
accounts that fund the many service contracts that support readiness” (p. 1). He further 
elaborated, “Since the CR funds the DoD base budget at roughly the FY 2012 
appropriations level, we face an additional reduction of $6 billion” (p. 1). He went on to 
Dollars in billions
Category of reduction Army Navy Air Force SOCOM
Total for fiscal 
years 2012-2016 
Reorganizations 5.4 15.4 4.2 0 25
Better business practices 10.3 14.1 20.6 0.4 45.4
Program reductions/terminations 11 5.5 3.7 1.3 21.5
Reductions in lower priority programs 2.8 0 4.8 0.6 8.2
Total 29.5 35 33.3 2.3 100.1
Fiscal years 2012-2016
 20 
say that as a result of the fiscal uncertainty, damage to the DoD and the defense industry 
is unavoidable (Kendall, 2013a). Kendall invited the leaders of industry to engage in 
open dialogue with the DoD to help minimize the impact the current fiscal environment 
will have on both the DoD and industry. This letter really shows the dire situation of our 
economy and how it will impact not only the DoD but also the defense industrial base. 
9. Implementation Directive for Better Buying Power 2.0: Achieving 
Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending (April 24, 
2013) 
This memo was an update to the November 13, 2012, memo that addressed 
acquisition professionals and introduced BBP 2.0 and the seven focus areas for achieving 
efficiency and productivity. Kendall’s (2013b) seven areas are as follows: achieve 
affordable programs, control costs throughout the product lifecycle, incentivize 
productivity and innovation in industry, eliminate unproductive processes and 
bureaucracy, promote effective competition, improve tradecraft in services acquisition, 
and improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce. Kendall (2013b) 
provided his key overarching principles that govern BBP and all its accompanying 
efforts. The principles are as follows: 
• Think. BBP 2.0 is not dogma. It is guidance subject to professional judgment. 
The acquisition workforce needs to apply our education, training, and 
experience through analysis and creative, informed thought to address our 
daily decisions.  
• People. All the policies and processes we have are of no use if we do not have 
the right people who are experienced, trained and empowered to apply them 
effectively. In the end, qualified people are essential to successful outcomes, 
and professionalism, particularly in acquisition leaders, drives results more 
than any policy change.  
• Start with the basics. Kendall emphasizes the need to apply the basics of 
acquisition in everything acquisition professionals do simply because they 
work.  
• Streamline decisions. All acquisition processes and oversight need to be 
streamlined in order to provide added value. 
BBP 2.0 implementation guidance with specific actions to be taken in each of the 
seven focus areas was included as an attachment to this memo. In regard to SCM, 
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Kendall provided in the attachment his general guidance stating that should-cost is 
“fundamental to proactive cost control throughout the acquisition lifecycle” (Kendall, 
2013b, Attachment 2, p. 2). He added that will-cost estimates will continue to be the basis 
for the president’s budget, but “we cannot accept these estimates as self-fulfilling” (p. 2). 
Kendall (2013b) said that our goal should be to “identify opportunities to do better and to 
manage toward that goal” (p. 2). PMs should scrutinize every estimate and find ways to 
reduce cost without trading off value. He further stated that the goal is to eliminate “low 
value added ingredients of program cost and to appropriately reward those who succeed 
in doing this, both in Government and in industry” (p. 3). The specific actions pertaining 
to SCM that Kendall (2013b) addressed in his BBP 2.0 Guidance and Actions, 
Attachment 2, are as follows:  
• Acquisition manager’s performance evaluations should consider effective cost 
control including implementation of should cost management;  
• ACAT I through III programs should have Should Cost targets in place by 
August 1, 2013, or the next milestone decision, whichever comes first; 
• The Principal Deputy USD (PDUSD[AT&L]) will refine, clarify, and re-issue 
guidance from BBP 1.0 by June 1, 2013, to ensure understanding, 
implementation, and reporting of should cost management. Guidance will 
cover acquisition of both products and services;  
• PEOs and PMs will report Should Cost targets for all ACAT I programs and 
progress in achieving them at all Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries 
(DAES) and Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) program reviews;  
• The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) will create a repository for best 
practices and create rapid deployment training for the acquisition workforce 
by August 1, 2013. DAU will work with the component acquisition executives 
(CAEs) to collect successful should cost studies and lessons learned. DAU 
will also improve and better integrate should cost management principles 
across all DAU curricula by November 1, 2013;  
• The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) will collaborate with 
the CAEs to implement an annual planning process to maximize the use of the 
DCMA Cost and Pricing Center capability for assisting program offices and 
PEOs with should cost activities by June 1, 2013. 
B. SHOULD-COST MANAGEMENT LITERATURE 
This section highlights all documents related to the SCM aspect of Carter’s BBPi. 
The directives begin in April 2011 with a two-page memorandum tasking service 
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acquisition executives, PEOs, and PMs to implement will-cost and SCM into each ACAT 
program. The documents are listed in chronological order to show the building of 
implementation guidance over time. 
1. Federal Acquisition Regulation: Should-Cost Management Reviews 
(March 2005, Reissued April 1, 2013) 
The FAR mentions should-cost reviews in subpart 15.407-4 (2013). Guidance for 
should-cost reviews in FAR 15 is different than the guidance issued in the BBPi. The 
FAR specifically states the following (original section numbering intact): 
15.407-4 Should-cost review. 
(a) General.  
(1) Should-cost reviews are a specialized form of cost analysis. 
Should-cost reviews differ from traditional evaluation methods 
because they do not assume that a contractor’s historical costs reflect 
efficient and economical operation. Instead, these reviews evaluate the 
economy and efficiency of the contractor’s existing work force, 
methods, materials, equipment, real property, operating systems, and 
management. These reviews are accomplished by a multifunctional 
team of Government contracting, contract administration, pricing, 
audit, and engineering representatives. The objective of should-cost 
reviews is to promote both short and long-range improvements in the 
contractor’s economy and efficiency in order to reduce the cost of 
performance of Government contracts. In addition, by providing 
rationale for any recommendations and quantifying their impact on 
cost, the Government will be better able to develop realistic objectives 
for negotiation. 
(2) There are two types of should-cost reviews—program should-cost 
review (see paragraph (b) of this subsection) and overhead should-cost 
review (see paragraph (c) of this subsection). These should-cost 
reviews may be performed together or independently.  
(b) Program should-cost review.  
(1) A program should cost review is used to evaluate significant 
elements of direct costs, such as material and labor, and associated 
indirect costs, usually associated with the production of major systems.  
(2) A program should-cost review should be considered, particularly in 
the case of a major system acquisition (see Part 34), when— 
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(i) Some initial production has already taken place; 
(ii) The contract will be awarded on a sole source basis; 
(iii) There are future year production requirements for substantial 
quantities of like items; 
(iv) The items being acquired have a history of increasing costs; 
(v) The work is sufficiently defined to permit an effective analysis and 
major changes are unlikely; 
(vi) Sufficient time is available to plan and adequately conduct the 
should-cost review; and 
(vii) Personnel with the required skills are available or can be assigned 
for the duration of the should-cost review. (FAR 15.407-4, 2013) 
2. Implementation of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management (April 22, 
2011) 
This memo to acquisition and logistics professionals from Carter was a follow-up 
to his September 2010 directive to implement “an internal management tool for all 
ACAT I, II, and III programs” (Carter, 2011a, p. 1). This memo provided clear direction 
of implementing will-cost and SCM and scrutinizing every element of government and 
contractor costs (Carter, 2011a). Will-cost and SCM are used to increase productivity in 
contract negotiations, program execution, and sustainment in order to eliminate cost 
overruns and deliver independent cost estimate programs below budget. Incentives for 
both the government and industry manager will be a key to success of the SCM program. 
Carter (2011a) recommended sharing savings realized as an incentive in the form of 
additional program resources and professional recognition for the government manager 
and increased profit and corporate recognitions for the industry manager. 
This memo’s main focus was to direct PMs to develop, own, track, and report 
against should-cost estimates. Carter recommended using all available resources within 
the DoD, such as the DCMA, to assist in development of should-cost estimates. The 
estimates will then be reviewed at every milestone decision and at each Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary review. Each service acquisition executive must also 
send an annual report of should-cost progress beginning in November 2011 (Carter, 
2011a). 
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Carter tasked the service acquisition executives, PEOs, and PMs to find the best 
method of meeting the initiative’s intent. Should-cost estimates can be developed using 
any three methods described by the initiative or in any combination of the methods. The 
first method is a bottoms-up estimate if the detailed analysis is useful. The second 
method is to identify actionable and achievable reductions from the will-cost estimate. 
Any reductions that are achieved from an immediate investment should be brought to the 
MDA for approval before being considered a should-cost estimate. The third method is 
using competitive contracting and contract negotiations to find should-cost savings 
(Carter, 2011a). 
Finally, this memo included two attachments, Ingredients of Should-Cost 
Management and A list of Will-Cost and Should-Cost Management Pilot Programs. The 
ingredients are a list of activities and practices that, if utilized, will help achieve should-
cost savings. Specifically, Carter’s SCM ingredients are as follows: 
1) Scrutinize each contributing ingredient of program cost and justify 
it. Why is it reported or negotiated? What reasonable measures might 
reduce it? 
2) Particularly challenge the basis for indirect costs in contractor 
proposals.  
3) Track recent program cost, schedule, and performance trends and 
identify ways to reverse negative trend(s). 
4) Benchmark against similar DoD programs and commercial 
analogues (where possible), and against other programs performed by 
the same contractor or in the same facilities. 
5) Promote Supply Chain Management to encourage competition and 
incentivize cost performance at lower tiers. 
6) Reconstruct the program (government and contractor) team to be 
more streamlined and efficient. 
7) Identify opportunities to breakout Government-Furnished 
Equipment versus prime contractor-provided items 
8) Identify items or services contracted through a second or third party 
vehicle. Eliminate unnecessary pass-through costs by considering 
other contracting options. 
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9) In the area of test: 
a. Take full advantage of integrated Developmental and Operational 
Testing to reduce overall cost of testing; 
b. Integrate modeling and simulation into the test construct to reduce 
overall costs and ensure optimal use of National test facilities and 
ranges. 
10) Identify an alternative technology/material that can potentially 
reduce development or life cycle costs for a program. Ensure the prime 
product contract includes the development of this technology/material 
at the right time. (Carter, 2011a, p. 3) 
3. Army Implementation of Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics) (USD[AT&L]) Affordability Initiatives 
(June 10, 2011) 
This memo for Army PEOs by Heidi Shyu, the Acting Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA[ALT]), is the Army’s 
implementation directive and a show of its support for Ashton Carter’s BBPi. The main 
focus of the memo is to provide detailed guidance on the implementation of the Target 
Affordability and Cost Growth portion of the BBPi, of which SCM is the tool 
 used to achieve the initiative. Shyu (2011) directed five initiatives: “(1) mandate 
affordability as a requirement, (2) drive productivity growth through should-cost/ 
will-cost management, (3) eliminate redundancy in Warfighter portfolios, (4) make 
production rates economical and hold them stable, (5) set shorter timelines and manage to 
them” ( p. 1). 
The memo provides specific instructions regarding should-cost/will-cost 
management. According to the memo, each ACAT I, II, and III program will use SCM to 
push leanness into their programs. Conducting should-cost analysis against the will-cost 
estimate assists in achieving lean programs. Each program was directed to ensure that the 
will-cost estimate was independently verified prior to milestone decisions. Additionally, 
should-cost analysis should not be conducted one time to achieve one estimate. Should-
cost analysis should be continuous and conducted throughout the life of the program, 
from contract negotiations, through program execution, and into sustainment. Should-cost 
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estimates are established, and then the PM is directed to manage to that estimate using 
initiatives that achieve the savings.  
Shyu (2011) directed that all ACAT I, II, and III programs have MDA-approved 
should-cost execution targets. Each PM and PEO was directed to manage, report, track, 
and defend the targets and initiatives identified to achieve the targets. Progress would be 
tracked during each milestone decision and from annual reports submitted by PEOs and 
PMs to ASA(ALT) not later than October 30 of each year. 
Regarding the program funding, all program funding would be issued using the 
should-cost estimate for the program. The difference in funding between the should-cost 
estimate and the will-cost estimate would be withheld at the MDA, typically ASA(ALT) 
for ACAT I and the PEO for ACAT II and III. The MDA is the approval authority to 
issue any additional funds to the program.  
Finally, the memo provided two enclosures containing additional reporting 
requirements and should-cost implementation details. Enclosure 1 is the slide template 
for a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), which provides a will-cost/should-cost 
management report slide example. Enclosure 2 provides SCM definitions, management 
processes and procedures, and reporting processes and procedures (Shyu, 2011). 
4. Should-Cost and Affordability (August 24, 2011) 
This memo for defense acquisition and logistics professionals from Carter was an 
effort to clarify any confusion between the affordability as a requirement and SCM 
initiatives. Affordability as a requirement directs goals to be established based on design 
and capability trades to achieve what the service can pay in production and sustainment 
costs. These should be set early in the program, prior to Milestone B. While affordability 
is the driving cost-management initiative, assumptions about future costs are made during 
early program analysis and development. Should-cost can still be used early on to bring 
down overhead and government costs. 
SCM focuses on the continuous fight to lower costs throughout program 
execution through initiatives to drive leanness into the program, typically at and after 
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Milestone B. Both initiatives could come into conflict around Milestone B. However, 
should-cost initiatives should not trade capability or long-term sound design practices for 
near-term savings. Simply put, SCM is used to challenge the assumptions embedded in 
those analysis, formulate should-cost estimates for production and sustainment, and work 
to achieve those estimates (Carter, 2011b). 
5. Should-Cost Management: Why? How? (October 2011) 
This article written by Carter and John Mueller was published in the September–
October 2011 edition of Defense AT&L magazine. The article explained the logic and 
reason for implementing will-cost and SCM and made the case for PMs to use the will-
cost estimate of the ICE as the program cost ceiling, as opposed to the floor. 
Unfortunately, the ICE has historically become the floor from which costs rise. The will-
cost estimate is generally created using historical costs, deriving an estimate of future 
costs. The use of historical data creates many opportunities to utilize SCM analysis and 
techniques to drive down program costs.  
The article also laid out objectives for should-cost implementation and Carter’s 
expectations: scrutinize every element of program costs, look for savings in repetitive 
activities, leverage the learning curves, examine overhead and indirect costs, and 
incentivize contractors to achieve cost savings. Each of the previous expectations is an 
area in which SCM could be effective due to the nature of will-cost estimate creation 
(Carter & Mueller, 2011). 
6. Should-Cost Review: A Pragmatic Approach to Affordability 
(November 2011) 
Randy Garber and Bob Willen (2011) from AT Kearney, a public consulting firm, 
published an article about the differences between traditional cost estimation and should-
cost analysis, and the characteristics needed in order for a SCM to succeed. Successful 
SCM should reduce government costs without reducing the manufacturer’s profit. Garber 
and Willen stated that when AT Kearney conducts should-cost analysis in its business, it 
sees total system costs realizing 5% to 15% savings and some subsystems realizing up to 
40% savings (Garber & Willen, 2011).  
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The secret to AT Kearney’s success is in five characteristics: bring best practices 
to bear, perform rigorous analysis, establish the right incentives, translate opportunities 
into tangible actions, and track performance against cost-reduction plans (Garber & 
Willen, 2011). Garber and Willen’s (2011) figure from the article best illustrates the five 
characteristics of successful should-cost reviews (see Figure 3). 
 
 A. T. .Kearney’s Five Characteristics of a Successful Should-Cost Review Figure 3. 
(from Garber & Willen, 2011, p. 3) 
7. Should-Cost Templates (December 12, 2011) 
This memo published by Nancy Spruill, the Director of Acquisition Resources 
and Analysis and the DAB Secretary, is guidance on should-cost templates for all DAB 
board members and advisors. The attachment to the memo is a template for PEO and PM 
should-cost initiatives to be presented at all MDA decision meetings at Milestone B and 
later for ACAT I programs. It is also recommended for use by all ACAT II and III 
programs to be used at their Millstone B and later decision meetings.  
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The slide template requires the PM to report each should-cost initiative used in all 
phases of the program’s lifecycle, as well as the amount of savings the PM expects to 
realize from the initiative. The template starts at FY0, indicating the current year, and 
continues through FY+3. This template makes no reference to any savings realized 
during prior years from should-cost initiatives (Spruill, 2011). 
8. An Analysis of Potential Impacts of Ashton Carter’s “Should-Cost” 
Memorandum on Defense Contracting (September 17, 2012) 
E. Cory Yoder, a senior lecturer at Naval Postgraduate School, published a thesis 
of his research on the potential impacts of Carter’s SCM portion of the BBPi. Yoder’s 
research was conducted using a thorough literature review of policy documents and 
interviews with key individuals associated with the should-cost initiative. The primary 
focus of Yoder’s research examined a potential conflict between the should-cost initiative 
and the definition and use of commercial items in Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
(FARA) and Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) statutes. Yoder (2012) 
recommended fixing the potential conflict by making the definition of commercial items 
in statutes less broad.  
Yoder’s research also examined the differences between should-cost reviews as 
defined in FAR 15 and the initiative’s version of SCM. He found that Carter’s initiative 
expands beyond the scope of FAR 15, which mostly covers capturing overhead savings 
during contract negotiations. This conflict between the initiative and the FAR was found 
to cause confusion in stakeholders who initially believed Carter’s intent was to merely 
revitalize an old practice. Yoder captured the essence of the conflict between the FAR 
and the initiative with Figure 4. 
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 Should-Cost Consciousness in Carter’s Initiative Figure 4. 
(from Yoder, 2012, p. 52) 
Yoder’s research also examined potential impacts of should-cost implementation 
due to how the DoD is currently structured. Yoder structured his analysis using his Three 
Integrated Pillars of Success (TIPS) framework: Personnel, Platforms, and Protocols. He 
defined Personnel as “having the right number and mix of personnel with the right 
credentials and experience that enables them to perform needed functions in DoD 
organizations” (Yoder, 2012, p. 55). Through interviews, it was revealed that the DCMA 
had an increase of 350 personnel and DCAA had an increase of 700 personnel to 
accommodate the should-cost initiative. Additionally, Yoder recommended that each 
program form Integrated Cost Analysis Teams (ICAT) composed of engineering, 
program management, pricing, and DCMA personnel for successful SCM 
implementation (Yoder, 2012). 
Yoder’s framework defined Platforms as referring to all “systems, including hardware 
and software systems, management information systems, report generation, and visibility to 
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those who need them” (Yoder, 2012, p. 55). He discovered that the DCMA launched the 
Contract Business Analysis Repository (CBAR) designed to capture, in real-time: 
• Forward pricing rate agreements/recommendations 
• Latest contractor business systems 
• Contractor Purchasing System Review (CPSR) data, deficiencies, and 
corrective action plans 
• Company data including but not limited to 
o Cash flow 
o Profit and/or fee, and 
o Return on investment (ROI) 
o Results of recent contract negotiations (business clearance 
versus actual negotiation results) 
o Etc. (Yoder, 2012, p. 60) 
Yoder’s framework defined Protocols as “statutory, regulatory, and business rules 
and processes that guide the DoD through the acquisition and contracting process” 
(Yoder, 2012, p. 55). The outcome of his research determined that the initiative protocols 
have been structured to provide maximum flexibility to PMs and PEOs. However, Yoder 
highlighted the confusion of the name of the initiative and the conflict with the same term 
in FAR 15. The initiative directs SCM to gain efficiencies throughout the program, 
whereas FAR 15 refers primarily to cost analysis being conducted in support of contract 
negotiations. Yoder’s recommendation to fix the confusion is to change the name of the 
initiative to Cost Consciousness (Yoder, 2012). 
Yoder’s research is the foundation for our case study research examining how one 
particular PEO and PM have implemented should-cost analysis into their organization. 
We plan to utilize Yoder’s framework of Personnel, Platforms, and Protocols to analyze 
their implementation of the initiative into the organization. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The literature reviewed provides the initial guidance from DoD and Army 
leadership for implementing SCM as part of the BBPi, the previous understanding of 
SCM as defined in the FAR, and some additional implementation recommendations from 
A. T. Kearney for successful should-cost reviews. The leadership guidance in each 
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memorandum is broad enough to allow programs the flexibility to implement based upon 
individual program lifecycles. The U.S. Army has implemented SCM with one 
memorandum of guidance found in our literature research. Interviews with personnel 
from ASA(ALT) and PEO Aviation revealed some additional SCM implementation 
guidance. 
The following chapter details our research methodology used to answer our 
primary and secondary research questions. The research methodology primarily consists 
of an extensive literature review, site visits to key organizations, and analysis of 
documents received during the site visits. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The structure of our research is based on Robert Yin’s (2009) Case Study Design. 
Yin’s case study methodology utilizes the steps of plan, design, prepare, collect, analyze, 
and share (p. 2). The focus of the case study is to answer “how the Army has 
implemented SCM as part of BBP.” Our research design is exploratory in nature because 
our literature review indicates that no other research has been conducted on how the 
Army has implemented SCM. We chose an exploratory case study research method to lay 
a foundation on the subject for other researchers to conduct follow-on research. The 
intent of our research is to create a baseline for Army should-cost implementation study. 
A. DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH 
The data collection process began at Naval Postgraduate School with an extensive 
literature review to analyze all previously published BBPi and SCM guidance and 
research found through open sources. The literature review was used to determine what 
pertinent information was available and identify the gaps that would need to be filled 
through other means to answer our research questions. We reviewed all published policy 
letters from USD(AT&L) and ASA(ALT) through September 2013. Analysis during the 
literature review led us to conclude that more information was needed to determine how 
PEOs and PMs have used published guidance to implement SCM at their levels. 
To add more fidelity to how the Army implemented SCM, particularly at the PEO 
and PM levels, we conducted site visits to key organizations in the SCM chain. Site visits 
allowed us to gather additional documentation not easily found in open sources and to 
observe how each organization has implemented SCM under the current published 
guidance. 
Site visits and data collection occurred at the following organizations: 
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics; USD[AT&L]), Acquisition Resource and Analysis (ARA) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA[ALT]), Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis 
(PARCA) 
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• PEO Aviation and subordinate PMs Utility Helicopter, and Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
• Defense Acquisition University (DAU) 
Our research uncovered a large amount of documentation, including policy 
memorandums, PowerPoint slide presentations, and published articles, that needed to be 
analyzed. To structure our analysis of the documents, we utilized Glenn Bowen’s 
“Document Analysis as a Qualitative Research Method” (2009). Bowen (2009) defined 
document analysis as “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents - 
both printed and electronic (computer based and Internet-transmitted) material” (p. 27). 
Additionally, Bowen (2009) listed five functions of documentary material: 
First, as indicated above, documents can provide data on the context 
within which research participants operate—a case of text providing 
context, if one might turn a phrase.  
Second, information contained in documents can suggest some 
questions that need to be asked and situations that need to be observed 
as part of the research.  
Third, documents provide supplementary research data.  
Fourth, documents provide a means of tracking change and 
development.  
Fifth, documents can be analyzed as a way to verify findings or 
corroborate evidence from other sources. (2010, p. 29–30)  
Analysis of documents provided a wealth of information to our research and was 
used to complement our other research and analysis techniques. 
The data collected during the site visits and document analysis was then analyzed 
against Naval Postgraduate Senior Lecturer, E. Cory Yoder’s (2012) Three Integrated 
Pillars of Success (TIPS) model. The TIPS model consists of Personnel, Platforms, and 
Protocols. Personnel refers to the people who are responsible for executing the process. 
Platforms refers to the systems both hardware and software that are required to process 
and share the data of a process. Protocols refers to the business rules, regulations, and 
laws that guide and regulate a process. Together personnel, platforms, and protocols form 
the pillars for any successful process.  
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Finally, our research is organized in five chapters. Chapter I contains an 
introduction, definition, background, history of SCM, and research questions and 
objectives. Chapter II consists of a literature review of the BBPi and SCM key documents 
and memos directing its implementation. In the literature review, we also analyze papers 
on PMs’ perspectives on the BBPi and potential impacts of SCM on defense contracting. 
Chapter IV contains an analysis and findings from our Army/PEO case study. Finally, in 
Chapter V we provide an overall summary, conclusion, and recommendations for further 
research. 
B. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we provided an overview of the methodology used in writing this 
report. We discussed using Yin’s case study method, Bowen’s document analysis 
method, and Yoder’s TIPS model. The three models were used to plan and frame our 
data. In the next chapter, we discuss the findings and analysis of our research. 
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IV. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to present and analyze the findings of our research 
in order to answer our primary research question: How has the Army implemented 
Should-Cost Management as directed by BBP 1.0 and BBP 2.0? We present all material 
found during our literature review, site visits, and document analysis. This chapter also 
answers our secondary research questions: What are the directives related to SCM from 
OSD, the Army, and the PEO; what is the organizational process for SCM in the Army; 
and what are the best should-cost practices found in this study to promulgate to the 
acquisition workforce at large? 
In 2012, Yoder examined the potential impacts of should-cost implementation on 
defense contracting using his TIPS model (Yoder, 2012). We use this model as a 
structure from which to present and analyze how the Army has implemented SCM. 
Yoder’s three pillars are personnel, platforms, and protocols. In a system, each of the 
pillars works in harmony with the others in order to achieve success.  
Yoder (2012) defined personnel as having the right people in the right 
organizations, with the right skills in order to successfully execute the needed functions 
of the system. The personnel pillar not only includes the personnel inside the system, but 
also any stakeholders outside the system. We present the personnel pillar in the Army 
SCM system as the chain of command link between the PM and the AAE and 
stakeholders from DoD organizations that are stakeholders in the system. 
Platforms are the systems used by the personnel to execute their functions (Yoder, 
2012). These systems can be any hardware or software systems, reporting systems, 
information systems, and so forth. To present the Army’s platforms in SCM, we focus on 
presenting the Army’s new system built specifically to execute SCM, the Army Should-
Cost/Will-Cost Database, and do not discuss any typical software commonly used by the 
Army, such as Microsoft products. 
Yoder (2012) defined protocols as “the statutory, regulatory, and business rules 
and processes that guide the DoD through acquisition and contract processes” (p. 85). We 
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apply this pillar to the protocols we discovered that provide the greatest assistance to the 
Army’s should-cost process. Protocols are presented at every level in the should-cost 
chain of command, from reporting protocols at the AAE level to should-cost 
development protocols at the PM level. Figure 5 shows the consolidated Personnel, 
Platforms, and Protocols for the Army’s SCM process. 
 
 Army’s Should-Cost Management Three Pillars of Integrative Success Figure 5. 
A. PERSONNEL: THE FIRST PILLAR OF INTEGRATIVE SUCCESS 
The personnel pillar in the Army’s SCM process is a product of all the key 
personnel in the Army’s should-cost chain of command, as well as all stakeholders 
outside the chain, such as DoD-level agencies or PEO and PM industry partners. Figure 6 




 Army’s Should-Cost Management Personnel Pillar Figure 6. 
1. Office of the Secretary of Defense Agencies 
a. Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (USD[AT&L]) 
The USD(AT&L) is the principal advisor and assistant to the Secretary of 
Defense as well as the Deputy for all DoD acquisition matters. As legislated by Congress, 
the USD(AT&L) supervises and establishes policies for all DoD acquisitions, to include (1) 
procurement of goods and services, (2) research and development, (3) contract 
administration, and (4) developmental testing. In addition, the USD(AT&L) oversees all 
matters pertaining to logistics, maintenance, and sustainment support for all elements of the 
DoD and establishes policies for maintaining the U.S. defense industrial base 
(USD[AT&L], 2013). As the current USD(AT&L), Frank Kendall places great top-level 
emphasis on the BBP and SCM initiatives carried over from his predecessor, Carter. 
Kendall presides over all Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES) and Defense 
Acquisition Board (DAB) program reviews personally to determine whether PEOs and 
PMs are actively pursuing and achieving should-cost targets for all ACAT I programs. 
 41 
Frank Kendall is in the top tier of all the key personnel within the DoD’s 
should-cost chain of command. All BBP and SCM directives flow down to all the 
services from him. Kendall, through a series of memos and published directives, laid out 
his focus areas where improvements needed to be made and provided specific guidance 
to PEOs and PMs to make the acquisition process more efficient. In his BBP 2.0 memo, 
Kendall (2012) provided his 36 points geared towards improving efficiencies. Kendall 
emphasized the importance of making improvements continuously throughout the 
acquisition process. In regard to controlling costs, he specifically called for setting cost 
targets below the ICE and managing programs with the intent to actually getting to those 
targets (Kendall, 2012). In his letter to industry partners, Kendall (2013a) explained the 
harsh realities of sequestration and its effects on the industrial base and petitioned 
industry leaders to engage with the DoD to help find ways to minimize the impact of the 
current fiscal environment to both the DoD and industry. On April 24, 2013, Kendall 
(2013b) published his BBP 2.0 implementation directive and overarching principles. The 
principles are 
1. Think. BBP 2.0 is not dogma. It is guidance subject to professional 
judgment. The acquisition workforce needs to apply our education, 
training, and experience through analysis and creative, informed 
thought to address our daily decisions.  
2. People. All the policies and processes we have are of no use if we 
don’t have the right people who are experienced, trained and 
empowered to apply them effectively. In the end, qualified people are 
essential to successful outcomes and professionalism, particularly in 
acquisition leaders, drives results more than any policy change.  
3. Start with the basics. Kendall emphasizes the need to apply the 
basics of acquisition in everything acquisition professionals do simply 
because they work.  
4. Streamline decisions. All acquisition processes and oversight need 
to be streamlined in order to provide added value (p. 13). 
The following are the specific actions pertaining to SCM that Kendall 
(2013b) addressed in his BBP 2.0 Guidance and Actions, Attachment 2: 
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Acquisition manager’s performance evaluations should consider 
effective cost control including implementation of should cost 
management;  
ACAT I through III programs should have Should Cost targets in place 
by August 1, 2013, or the next milestone decision, whichever comes 
first; 
The Principal Deputy USD (PDUSD (AT&L)) will refine, clarify, and 
re-issue guidance from BBP 1.0 by June 1, 2013, to ensure 
understanding, implementation, and reporting of should cost 
management. Guidance will cover acquisition of both products and 
services;  
PEOs and PMs will report Should Cost targets for all ACAT I 
programs and progress in achieving them at all Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summaries (DAES) and Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) 
program reviews;  
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) will create a repository for 
best practices and create rapid deployment training for the acquisition 
workforce by August 1, 2013. DAU will work with the component 
acquisition executives (CAEs) to collect successful should cost studies 
and lessons learned. DAU will also improve and better integrate 
should cost management principles across all DAU curricula by 
November 1, 2013;  
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) will collaborate 
with the CAEs to implement an annual planning process to maximize 
the use of the DCMA Cost and Pricing Center capability for assisting 
program offices and PEOs with should cost activities by June 1, 2013 
(p. 3). 
b. Defense Acquisition University  
According to BBP 2.0, the DAU is responsible for creating a repository 
for best practices and a rapid deployment training program for the acquisition workforce; 
working with CAEs to collect successful should-cost studies and lessons learned; and 
improving and integrating should-cost management principles across all DAU curricula 
(Kendall, 2013b). To this end, DAU professors have been compiling should-cost best 
practices from across all services and have incorporated SCM best practices and lessons 
learned into their Program Management Training (PMT) 401, Program Manager’s 
Course. PMT 401 is a nine-week executive-level resident course designed to 
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accommodate experienced acquisition professionals that have been selected for 
attendance due to their potential as leaders of major acquisition programs, IPTs, and 
major command division chiefs. By statute (Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act [DAWIA], 1990), PEOs, Deputy PEOs (DPEO), and ACAT I and II 
PMs and Deputy PMs (DPMs) are required to complete an advanced program 
management course beyond DAWIA Level III certification. PMT 401, combined with the 
DAU’s Executive Program Manager’s Course (PMT 402), meets this training 
requirement (Schoonover, 2012). The following are PMT 401’s eight overarching themes 
that involve studies of real world acquisition challenges: 
(1) leading a program in a rapidly changing environment; (2) leading 
program management operations in different acquisition phases; (3) 
working effectively with higher headquarters; (4) working effectively 
with industry; (5) achieving and maintaining excellent customer 
relations; (6) applying appropriate tools for the evolving information 
environment; (7) working effectively with external organizations; and 
(8) leading joint and international programs. (DAU iCatalog, 2013)   
Since September 2010, when BBP 1.0 first directed the use of SCM as a 
tool to drive down costs and promote efficiency and productivity in DoD acquisition 
programs, the DAU has been collecting should-cost best practices and lessons learned 
and sharing the information with future PEOs, PMs, and DPMs during their attendance at 
the PMT 401 course. The programs (case studies) studied by PMT 401 students execute 
various should-cost management strategies that are based on the individual characteristics 
of the program and its life-cycle phase. These strategies include 
1) partnering with the contractor to identify and prioritize cost 
reduction opportunities through traditional operational research 
methods; 
2) investing in automation to achieve manpower savings that reduce 
Total Ownership Costs; 
3) conducting a comprehensive should cost analysis based on FAR 
Part 15 to inform negotiations prior to a major contract award;  
4) maximizing competition through innovative contracting strategies; 
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5) obtaining Congressional approval for Multi-Year procurement 
based on savings justified in a Business Case Analysis; 
6) partnering with the contractor to enable Economic Order Quantities 
(EOQ) from the prime and sub-tier suppliers; 
7) optimizing manufacturing and assembly processes to more 
efficiently utilize facilities and labor; 
8) insuring that government and industry share the benefits of 
favorable financing arrangements, based on the OSD cash flow model; 
and  
9) stabilizing production rates and achieving learning curve and EOQ 
savings through sales to international allies and partner nations. 
(Husband, 2013, p. 1) 
Included as Figures 7 through 13 are examples of successful SCM 
strategies (best practices) that have been employed by various program offices. These 
strategies and lessons are promulgated to future PEOs, DPEOs, PMs, and DPMs during 
the DAU’s PMT 401 course at Fort Belvoir, VA. 
 
 AIM-9X Block II (from Husband, 2013, p. 5) Figure 7. 
Author: Mark Husband, Defense Systems Management College
AIM-9X Block II
$ Applied traditional operations research methods to identify 
and prioritize cost reduction opportunities
€ Fishbone diagram
€ Pareto Analysis
€ Plan of Action and Milestones
€ Establish measurable targets
€ Monitor progress
$ Accelerated production deliveries
$ Leveraged FMS for EOQ buys
$ Active Optical Target Detector manufacturing improvements
5/2/2013 14
Realized savings:  $21M for Lot 11
Projected savings: $82M (FY11-15); $595M over program of record
Defense AT&L, “Should-Cost Management Tactics” Husband and Mueller, (Nov/Dec 2012).
 45 
Figure 7 shows an aggressive application of SCM strategies coupled with 
effective contract negotiations for the AIM-9X program. The initiatives resulted in $21 
million in realized savings in 2011 for this program. The AIM-9X team was able to 
purchase 120 units for $21 million less than planned, and with the savings they were able 
to purchase an additional 28 units, reinvest in future cost reductions, and pay “pop-up” 
obsolescence bills (Husband, 2013). By utilizing traditional operations research 
methodologies such as fishbone diagrams, Pareto analysis, plan of action and milestones, 
establishing measurable targets, and monitoring progress, the PM was able to identify and 
prioritize cost reductions (Husband, 2013). The PM and his team used a three-step 
process shown in Figures 8, 9, and 10 to achieve cost savings. 
 
 AIM-9X Block II Step 1: Root Cause Analysis (from Husband, 2013, p. 15) Figure 8. 
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 AIM-9X Block II Step 2: Identify and Prioritize Opportunities Figure 9. 
(from Husband, 2013, p. 16) 
 
 AIM-9X Block II Step 3: Develop Discrete “Should Cost” POA&M Figure 10. 
(from Husband, 2013, p. 17) 
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 Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Program Figure 11. 
(from Husband, 2013, p. 30) 
Figure 11 illustrates the A Kit contract savings that were realized through 
negotiation and definitization contracting action with the lead vendor for the IAMD A 
Kit. Additionally, by integrating testing with the Lower Tier Project Office (LTPO) – 
PATRIOT, PM IAMD is projecting savings in the FY15-16 timeframe that are within 
target costs. Overall, projected savings for research, development, test, and evaluation 
(RDT&E) is $77 million, with $54 million realized to date through FY15 (Husband, 
2013). 
Author: Mark Husband, Defense Systems Management College
IAMD
Integrated Air and Missile Defense




€ Plan of Action and Milestones
€ Establish measurable targets
€ Monitor progress
$ A-Kit Design Implementation Contract
€ Definitization of UCA leveraged existing activities from contributing programs, 
reducing IAMD’s cost to develop adaptation kit
$ Lower Tier Project Office - Patriot / IAMD Combined Testing 
€ Concurrent activities at WSMR in FY15-16 for PATRIOT and IAMD; savings 
projected from combining flight tests to meet both programs’ requirements
5/2/2013 30
Realized savings:  ~$54M in RDT&E (FY13-15)
Projected savings: ~$240M in Procurement and ~$122M in O&S
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 EMD Should Cost Methodology (from Husband, 2013, p. 31) Figure 12. 
Figure 12 illustrates how other PMs are modeling their should-cost 
methodology after the AIM-9X Block II approach with adaptations for the Engineering 
and Manufacturing Development (EMD) program phase. Figure 13 is a list of lessons 
learned reported by the CAEs and consolidated by the DAU. 
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1. Analyze “Current Costs”
 Reviewed IAMD costs
 Each Product Office and Directorate Created a Common Understanding of Costs
 Identified Cost Drivers
2. Product Offices and Directorates Identified and Evaluated Opportunities
 Brainstormed Opportunities
 Selected Potential Initiatives
 Provided Evaluation Information:
– Benefit of Implementation to IAMD
– Investment Cost  to Implement
– Implementation Effort  (LOE to Implement)
– Operational Impact (Positive or Negative)
– Year of Implementation
3. IAMD Compared and Evaluated Potential Initiatives
 Evaluated all Potential Initiatives against evaluation information
 Potential Initiatives were also judged based on technical and programmatic merits as IAMD Leadership Team
 Preliminary List of Initiatives Selected
4. Developed IAMD “Should Cost” Plan
 Quad Charts developed for each initiative with greater detail on costs, savings per year, and a POA&M to achieve
 Developed an IAMD “Should Cost” Summary by year with all selected Initiatives
 Established Measurable IAMD Targets
EMD Should Cost Methodology
Methodology Modeled on AIM-9X Block II 
Program Approach from Aug 2011, with 
adaptations for EMD Program Phase
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 Lessons Learned/Challenges Reported by CAEs Nov 2012–Jan 2013 Figure 13. 
(from Husband, 2013, p. 51) 
c. Defense Contract Management Agency 
The DCMA is the DoD component that works with suppliers to ensure 
that all supplies and services are delivered on time, at cost, and according to performance 
specifications to all DoD, federal, and allied government agencies 
(http://www.dcma.mil/). The DCMA professionals serve as brokers and in-plant 
representatives for all federal and allied government purchasing agencies throughout the 
life of the contract. Prior to contract award, the DCMA provides advice and information 
to help develop solicitations, identify risks, select contractors, and write contracts. After 
contract award, the DCMA helps monitor contractors' performance and management 
systems to ensure that cost, performance, and schedules are in compliance with the terms 
of the contract(s) (http://www.dcma.mil/). 
In 2013, Kendall directed the DCMA to implement an annual planning 
process to maximize the use of the DCMA Cost and Pricing Center capability to assist 
program offices with should-cost activities by June 1, 2013 (Kendall, 2013). Yoder 
(2012) stated that  
Author: Mark Husband, Defense Systems Management College
Lessons Learned/Challenges
reported by CAEs, Nov 2012 – Jan 2013
$ Realized savings generally reallocated within program
$ Majority of savings are from a few large programs
$ Will-Cost baselines are inconsistent
$ Expertise to conduct SC activities is lacking
$ Difficult to distinguish between SC savings, Affordability 
initiatives, and cost avoidance
$ Continuing Resolution and budget cuts affect SC initiatives
$ Implementing SC for IT programs is challenging
$ Processes for collection, analysis and reporting are intensive
$ Hesitancy to share savings—concern about premature cuts
5/2/2013 51
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In order to effectively implement should cost, program offices must 
include all relevant stakeholders into integrated cost analysis teams 
(ICAT), and the teams must be established early in a program, 
preferably during definition … Within the Navy, ICATs are being 
accomplished by establishing integration in engineering, program 
management, and pricing teams—specifically, an integration that 
includes a DCMA partnership with Navy Price Fighters. (p. 55)  
The DCMA coordinates with the Naval Supply System Command’s Price 
Fighters to conduct price, cost, and engineering analyses for government customers. 
Formed in 1983, Price Fighters perform should-cost analyses on spare parts and weapon 
systems and provide Navy, DoD, and other federal agency buyers with quick and 
accurate data (https://www.navsup.navy.mil/navsup). During our site visit to PM Cargo, 
we learned that the DCMA worked with the Navy Price Fighters on behalf of PM Cargo 
to obtain accurate cost and pricing data to help the PM evaluate a proposal submitted by 
Robinson Helicopter Company prior to their fuel tank contract. Since Robinson did not 
sell helicopters or helicopter parts to other government agencies, there was no historical 
cost and pricing data available, other than its commercial catalog, for PM Cargo to 
evaluate the fairness and reasonableness of Robinson’s proposal. Navy Price Fighters 
went into the Robinson manufacturing facility, with Robinson’s consent, and simulated 
the manufacturing process to determine labor cost information and enabled PM Cargo to 
figure out what the fuel tanks should cost. 
2. Assistant Secretary of the Army, Acquisition, Logistics, and 
Technology (ASA[ALT]) 
The ASA(ALT) office is responsible for many areas, and acquisition oversight is 
one of them. In this section we provide an overview of the two main offices we found to 
contribute to the Army’s SCM implementation, the Army’s Acquisition Executive (AAE) 
and the Army’s Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) office. 
a. Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) 
According to Army Regulation 70-1 (Department of the Army [DA], 
2011), when directed by the Secretary of the Army, the ASA(ALT) will also execute the 
duties of the AAE. “The Army acquisition executive is solely responsible for acquisition 
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matters within the Department of the Army (DA) and is the single decision authority for 
all Army acquisition matters” (DA, 2011). The AAE is the first critical element in the 
Personnel Pillar of Integrative success. How the Army has implemented the SCM 
initiative begins with the duties and responsibilities of the AAE in the initiative.  
During our literature review, we analyzed eight published memorandums 
from USD(AT&L) that discuss, direct, and clarify issues with the implementation of the 
BBP and SCM initiatives. Should-cost implementation directives and guidance were 
published for the Component Acquisition Executives (CAEs), PEOs, PMs, and some 
OSD level agencies such as the DCMA and the DAU. All directives for the AAE were 
naturally focused around the expected duties and responsibilities of the top executive: 
establish SCM in Army acquisition programs, approve should-cost targets, monitor and 
oversee progress, report should-cost progress, and collect should-cost lessons learned. 
Table 2 is a consolidated list of all guidance found in the various policy implementation 
memos to the AAE on implementing SCM. 
 
 
Table 2.   Army Acquisition Executive Should-Cost Duties and Responsibilities 
Should-cost Guidance or Tasking Document Source
- Effective November 15, 2010, establish Should-cost targets as management tools for 
all ACAT I programs as they are considered for major Milestone Decisions
- By January 1, 2011, establish Should-cost estimates for ACAT II and III programs as 
they are considered for MS decisions. 
Carter, 2010c (directed 
implementation); Carter, 2011a 
(reinforced implementation)
Send an annual report of Should-cost progress beginning in November 2011. Carter, 2011a
Develop inventive plans for PMs to reinforce and reward commitment to the Will-
Cost and Should-cost management process. Carter, 2011a
Should-cost targets for ACAT I programs and ACAT II programs that the AAE is the 
MDA for will be approved by the AAE. Shyu, 2011
ACAT I through III programs should have Should-cost targets in place by August 1, 
2013, or the next milestone decision, whichever comes first. Kendall, 2013b
An acquisition manager's performance evaluation should consider effective cost 
control, including implementation of Should-cost management. Kendall, 2013b
DAU will work with component acquisition executives (CAEs) to collect successful 
Should-cost studies and lessons learned. Kendall, 2013b
Regardless of lifecycle phase, implement Should-cost management into all ACAT I, IA, 
II and III programs. Kendall, 2013c
CAEs and PEOs will: 1) review and approve Should-cost targets, 2)monitor progress, 
and 3) direct or recommend allocation of realized cost savings as appropriate. Kendall, 2013c
Determine own reporting requirements for effective Should-cost management 
oversight Kendall, 2013c
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During our site visit, we learned that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Army for Plans, Programs, and Resources (DASA[PPR]) and its subordinate office, 
Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA), were delegated duties and 
responsibilities to assist the AAE with management and oversight of the SCM initiative. 
b. Performance Assessment and Root Cause Analysis (PARCA) 
Every major process or operation requires a staff to manage the 
implementation and track compliance. The establishment of the PARCA office was first 
directed in public law. The WSARA (2009) directed the use of applicable personnel and 
resources towards conduct of performance assessments and root cause analysis. The 
performance assessments are defined in the WSARA (2009) as an evaluation of 
 (1) The cost, schedule, and performance of the program, relative to 
current metrics, including performance requirements and baseline 
descriptions; (2) The extent to which the level of program cost, 
schedule, and performance predicted relative to such metrics is likely 
to result in the timely delivery of a level of capability to the warfighter 
that is consistent with the level of resources to be expended and 
provides superior value to alternative approaches that may be available 
to meet the same military requirement. (§ 103c) 
Additionally, WSARA (2009) defines root cause analysis as 
an assessment of the underlying cause or causes of shortcomings in 
cost, schedule, or performance of the program, including the role, if 
any, of—  
(1) unrealistic performance expectations; 
(2  unrealistic baseline estimates for cost or schedule; 
(3)  immature technologies or excessive manufacturing or integration 
risk; 
(4)  unanticipated design, engineering, manufacturing, or technology 
integration issues arising during program performance; 
(5)  changes in procurement quantities; 
(6)  inadequate program funding or funding instability; 
(7)  poor performance by government or contractor personnel 
responsible for program management; or 
(8)  any other matters. (§ 103d)  
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Should-cost analysis is a process that the OSD and Army leadership 
expect to be incorporated into every program regardless of where that program is in the 
lifecycle. Should-cost initiatives are to be instituted in order to achieve current year 
savings below the budgeted base line. This management process is effectively becoming 
a significant element in managing a program. Who better to manage the day to day 
activities of the should-cost management initiative than the office responsible for 
program process and root cause analysis.  
The Army PARCA office has been delegated the management 
responsibility of collecting, tracking, analyzing, and reporting all elements of the SCM 
initiative. PARCA is essentially the main point of entry of SCM data between the AAE 
and the PEOs and PMs. Table 3 is a complete list of all published PARCA duties and 
responsibilities with regard to the SCM initiative. 
 
Table 3.   Army PARCA Should-Cost Duties and Responsibilities 
PARCA Function Should-cost Guidance or Tasking Document Source
Collect / Track
Initial and updated Will-cost estimates and Should-cost estimates must be 
provided to the Army DASA (PPR) PARCA office… Shyu 2011; Shyu 2013
Collect / Track
Receive notification letters from PEOs when updates to approved Should-cost 
estimates are made to ACAT II and III programs where the PEO is the MDA. Shyu 2011
Collect / Track Collect and process Should-cost estimate requirement waiver requests Shyu 2011
Collect / Track
Receive monthly reports from PEOs on any release of delta dollars (margin 
withholds) Shyu 2011
Collect / Track Track the execution of margin release Shyu 2013
Collect / Track
PEOs are required to use the PARCA developed Should-cost database to 
capture information on their initiatives, exemptions, and margin releases. Shyu 2013
Collect / Track
Collect should-cost case studies from PEOs and identify based on best 
practices, which should be included in the DAU repository. Shyu 2013
Analyze
Delegated review authority for all initiatives, exemptions, and margin release. 
PARCA will report updates to the Principle Deputy on a monthly basis. Shyu 2013
Report
Present Should-cost management waiver requests to the Principal Deputy for 
approval during the monthly reviews. Shyu 2013
Report
Send a consolidated report to the ASA(ALT) showing programs using dollars 
within the delta between the Will-cost and Should-cost estimates. Shyu 2011
Report
Prepare reports that will be presented based on inputs into the Should-cost 
database. Shyu 2013
Report
Beginning 01 August 2013, report total active ACAT I, II and III programs, 
programs with and without should-cost initiatives, and the number of 
requirement waivers: 1) monthly to the Principal Deputy and 2) quarterly to 
OSD Shyu 2013
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In FY12, the Army PARCA office was instrumental in the continued 
implementation of SCM. One of the key functions that PARCA executed was to help 
educate the PEO and PM staff on SCM. PARCA conducted on site visits and workshops 
at each PEO to assist with their implementation (Shyu, 2012). On site, face-to-face 
education of the SCM initiative is an effective way to show the AAE’s emphasis on the 
new initiative and that it is taken seriously and executed properly. In addition to the 
workshops, there were two forums created to assist with education of the should-cost 
initiative, tracking implementation, and sharing of lessons learned. 
The Army PARCA established two habitual meeting forums in which to 
track and share lessons learned from SCM initiatives: monthly IPTs with the PEO’s 
business managers and quarterly status reviews (Shyu, 2012). The monthly IPTs are 
utilized to discuss each PEOs’ should-cost implementation plan, issues, challenges, and 
successful strategies and initiatives (Shyu, 2012). PARCA’s IPT is a forum used to assist 
with educating the acquisition community on SCM, continually assisting with 
implementation of SCM, and providing a forum for PEOs’ staff to continue improvement 
in their own should-cost by hearing lessons learned from other offices. PARCA’s 
quarterly reviews provide a forum to track the continued improvement and execution of 
should-cost initiatives.  
PARCA’s implementation actions led it to develop a Microsoft Access 
database in FY12 (Shyu, 2012). This database provides the complete chain from PARCA 
to the PMs to collect, track, analyze, and report should-cost initiatives. During our site 
visit, we had the opportunity to view the database. This database is the key platform that 
provides a critical should-cost data link between the AAE’s PARCA office and the PEOs. 
We provide a review of this database later in this chapter. 
PARCA’s implementation efforts provided the critical link between the 
AAE and the PEOs. According to Shyu (2012), senior Army leadership support and 
reinforce SCM from the AAE down to the lowest level. Our analysis shows that 
PARCA’s activities directly show the AAE’s SCM support and the continued 
reinforcement that SCM will be implemented and utilized indefinitely. 
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3. Program Executive Officer (PEO) Aviation 
The PEO’s mission is to  
provide executive level management of all assigned acquisition 
programs. In that capacity, the PEO provides overall direction and 
integration of assigned weapon system programs and assures effective 
interface with Headquarters, Department of the Army, as well as other 
services, combat system developers, and supporting commands and 
activities. He optimizes the weapon systems interoperability and 
standardization and exercises executive level authority and 
responsibility for program management, technical and quality 
management, logistics support and readiness management activities of 
assigned weapon systems 
(https://www.peoavn.army.mil/SitePages/Home2.aspx)  
In regard to SCM, Kendall, in his BBP 2.0 (2013b), directed PEOs and PMs to 
report should-cost targets for all ACAT I programs and progress in achieving them at all 
Defense Acquisition Executive Summaries (DAES) and Defense Acquisition Board 
(DAB) program reviews.  
PEO Aviation has been meticulously tracking the BBP initiatives and reporting on 
status of all ACAT I programs at DAES and DAB reviews as directed. Included in the 
reports to DAES and DAB are metrics addressing how SCM has been implemented, 
incentives and recognition mechanisms, and lessons learned in accordance with the BBP 
directives (Shyu, 2013). ACAT II programs are reported to the Deputy for Acquisition 
and Systems Management (DASM) and ACAT III programs are reported to the PEO.  
PEO Aviation, under the leadership of Major General (MG) Crosby, has fully 
embraced and implemented the guidance and directives in the BBP and SCM. During our 
site visit, we learned that the PEO holds monthly reviews with all O-5PMs of ACAT II 
and III programs within the portfolio. PEO Aviation consists of eight PM offices: PM 
Apache Attack Helicopter, PM Armed Scout Helicopter, PM Aviation Systems, PM 
Cargo Helicopter, PM Fixed Wing Aircraft, PM Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft, PM 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, and PM Utility Helicopters. Shyu (2013) has directed that 
all PEOs utilize the PARCA-developed should-cost database to capture their should-cost 
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initiatives, exemptions, and margin releases by October of each fiscal year (FY) and 
conduct updates quarterly or when there are changes to the program (Shyu, 2013).  
PEOs are required to report on their cost target and progress against those targets, 
plans of action, milestones for their major should-cost initiatives, and the projected and 
realized savings (Shyu, 2013). PEO Aviation is in compliance with this directive. Figure 
14, from PEO Aviation’s DAES brief in February 2013, illustrates some of its BBP and 
should-cost initiatives. PEO Aviation is tracking the BBP 2.0 initiatives and conducting 
monthly reviews of all of its ACAT I-III programs with almost 70% of its initiatives 
completed. 
 
 PEO Aviation BBP Overview (from PEO Aviation, 2013) Figure 14. 
PEOs are required to submit an exemption for programs that are not able to obtain 
an initiative. In accordance with the Implementation of Should-Cost Management memo 
(Shyu, 2013), there are two categories that qualify for an exemption: a program has less 
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than $3M remaining per year, or it is a joint program with another service as the 
executive agent (Shyu, 2013). If exemption information changes, the PEO will notify 
PARCA within 30 days and must submit either a new exemption or initiative, if needed, 
within 90 days (Shyu, 2013). PEO Aviation has delegated responsibility for data entry 
into the Army Will-Cost/Should-Cost database to the PEO Aviation business manager, 
which is in compliance with Shyu’s memo (2013). Table 4 is a complete list of all 
published PEO duties and responsibilities with regard to the SCM initiative. 
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Table 4.   PEO Aviation Should-Cost Duties and Responsibilities 
Should-cost Guidance or Tasking Document Source
PEOs will ensure PMs implement Should-cost management by identifying opportunities for savings and 
developing Should-cost estimates for their ACAT I, II, and III programs. Beginning in FY 2014, Should-cost 
management objectives will be included in Acquisition Managers employee contribution planning and Officer's 
major performance objectives Shyu, 2013 
PEO managed ACAT II and III programs will continue to develop and have independent verification of Will-cost 
estimates prior to milestone decision Shyu, 2013 
PEOs are required to use the PARCA developed Should-cost database to capture information on their initiatives, 
exemptions, and margin release. Initiatives and exemptions are to be entered into the database by October of 
each FY and updated on a quarterly basis or when program changes occur. Margin releases are expected to be 
entered once the initiative has been successful and the PEOs are requesting the withhold Shyu, 2013 
PEOs and PMs are required to report on their cost target and progress against those targets, plans of action, 
milestones for major Should-cost initiatives, and their savings projected and realized Shyu, 2013 
PEOs will include in their DAES briefings, metrics addressing how Should-cost has been implemented within their 
portfolios, incentive and recognition mechanisms in place, and lessons learned Shyu, 2013 
PEOs are required to submit an exemption for programs that are not able to obtain an initiative. There are two 
categories that qualify a program for an exemption: program has less than $3M remaining per year or it is a joint 
program with another Service as the executive agent Shyu, 2013 
PEOs will withhold the difference between the funds distributed and the program budget baseline for programs 
for which they are the MDA; margin releases will be allocated to fulfill unfunded requirements, to accelerate 
acquisition, and to fund cost reduction. PEOs are required to complete margin release forms that will identify the 
distribution of funds and will require approval based on the MDA authority. The PEOs will be the decision 
authority for the programs where they are the MDA. Shyu, 2013 
PEOs will delegate responsibility for data entry into the Army Will-cost/Should-cost database Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 1
PEOs will be responsible for "verifying" data entered into the Will-cost/Should-cost database Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 4
PEOs will upload files to AKO folder by the 15th of every month so PARCA can review and upload to AKO by the 
30th of every month. This process will enable the Affordability IPT held at the PARCA to review most current will 
cost/should cost data floated up from the PMs/PEOs Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 9
PEOs have approval authority for ACAT Is and below and review and verification authority for ACAT I programs. 
Ms. Shyu has approval authority for ACAT Is, and override authority for ACAT Is and below. PARCA will review all 
initiatives, exemptions, and margin release to concur Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 10
Ensure the database has a hierarchy of all programs to effectively roll up initiative and exemption funding values 
to the PEO level. Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 20
PEOs will recertify exemption status quarterly. If any exemption information changes, the PEO/PM must notify 
PARCA within 30 days and must submit either a new exemption or initiative within 90 days if necessary Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 21
If any exemption information changes, the PEO/PM must notify PARCA within 30 days and must submit either a 
new exemption or initiative if necessary within 90 days. PARCA will inform Ms. Shyu of their status and provide 
any necessary instructions for moving forward. The 90 day clock for submitting changes for an exemption will 
begin once the PEO/PM identifies the change in the system. Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 22
For exemption and margin release approval (ACAT IIs and below), the approval authority (PEO) must print and 
sign the database generated form. The document must then be scanned and attached to the initiative in the 
database and the approver must update the status manually Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 27
PEO shall validate a monthly report in the should cost database showing the amount of funds that have been 
released and the purpose of the release. A consolidated monthly report will be sent to the Principle Deputy and 
the AAE showing all programs margin with-hold and release Shyu, 2013 - Attachment 3
All ACAT II and III programs are required to develop and have independent verification of will cost estimates prior 
to milestone decisions. As with ACAT Is, the will cost estimate will be used as the basis for all budgeting and 
programming decision. All metrics and reporting external to the Department will be based on the will cost 
estimate. Shyu, 2011
All ACAT II and III programs will have MDA approved should cost execution targets. PEOs will have approval 
authority for the ACAT II programs delegated to them and ACAT III programs and will report annually on their 
progress to ASA(ALT). Shyu, 2011
PEOs and PMs of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs)and major automated information system 
programs will report should cost targets and progress in achieving them at Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary (DAES) and DAB reviews. PEOs will provide, via the DAES briefings, quantitative metrics addressing how 
should cost has been implemented within their portfolios, incentive and recognition mechanisms in place, and 
lessons learned. PEOs will also provide case studies of should cost initiatives to the Defense Acquisition 
University for use in its training materials and BBP repository established to collect and share best practices.
Kendall, 2013 - Should Cost 
Management in Defense Acquisition, 
memo - DRAFT
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a. PEO Business Management Office (BMO) 
The BMO is responsible for facilitating operations and providing 
oversight of the PEO’s financial resources to ensure transparency and accountability. The 
BMO’s primary focus areas consist of program analysis, budget execution, cost analysis, 
and special programs oversight (http://www.peogcs.army.mil/). In regard to should-cost, 
the BMO is the central point of contact and the collection point for all should-cost and 
BBPi data. The BMO collects and consolidates all should-cost data from the PMs and 
populates the information into a centralized database created by the PARCA Office of 
ASA(ALT). The information is collected from the PMs and reported to ASA(ALT) bi-
annually or as required. 
4. Program Manager 
a. PM Should-Cost Duties and Responsibilities 
PMs are critical to the implementation of SCM. Acquisition program 
management positions (PMs at the O-6/GS-15 or broadband/pay equivalent and product 
managers at the O-5/GS-14 level) are centrally selected from a CSL-key billet list (DA, 
2011). PMs are assigned to programs at milestone A or prior to program initiation at 
milestone B. PMs must execute a tenure and program management agreement and 
receive formal charter from the AAE. The charter is the PMs’ authority to command the 
Program Management Office (PMO) that they are assigned to. Having charter, the PMs 
have a clear line of authority extending to the AAE; thus making the PMs responsible for 
all actions that happen within a program to include implementation of should-cost 
management. 
The PM level is where SCM is planned and executed. PMs are responsible 
for leading, planning, and executing all aspects of SCM on all ACAT I, II, and III 
programs. Should-cost management is a holistic way for PMs to reduce costs across the 
lifecycle of their programs. Should-cost targets are developed by PMs using the 
program’s will-cost estimate as the budgeted base, applying specific and measurable 
initiatives for savings measured against that base. PM UAS accomplished its should-cost 
planning and execution using a variety of personnel that included the PM and staff, cross-
functional program management IPTs, and a wide variety of Army and DoD 
organizations and assets.  
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Table 5, Should-Cost Guidance or Tasking, lays out the specific tasks 
required of Army PMs to implement SCM in their programs. The tasks were developed 
based on Carter’s initial guidance found in BBP 1.0 and later refined and updated in 
Kendall’s BBP 2.0. The AAE further refined and promulgated her guidance to Army 
PMs in the memo Implementation of Should-Cost Management (Shyu, 2013). 
 
Table 5.   Program Manager Should-Cost Task List 
The task list is not all-inclusive but includes the framework and guidance 
from the AAE to PMs to successfully implement SCM. We discovered that all should-
cost tasks are not all consolidated into any single document for ease of reference. The 
tasks are found in multiple memorandums for record, business rules, and other forms of 
correspondence. This is for two reasons: 1) SCM is an evolving practice and has required 
Should-cost Guidance or Tasking Document Source
PMs implement Should-cost management by identifying opportunities for savings and developing should-cost 
estimates for their ACAT I, II, and III programs, NLT 1 Aug 2013. Should-cost targets will be broken out by 
appropriation type. Cost savings that span multiple years, when it is reported at the end of the year, it should be 
reported as still in progress. Shyu, 2013 
Will-cost and Should-cost estimates are required for all ACAT I, II, and III milestone reviews. All reviews must be 
vetted by a cross functional team to include cost, financial management and budget, contracting, engineering, 
logistics, and programming representatives. Shyu, 2013 - attachment #3
PMs with multiple active subprograms under one program, should have a baseline for each program Shyu, 2013 - Business Rules
Beginning in 2014, should-cost management objectives will be included in acquisition managers employee 
contribution planning and the officer's major performance objectives. Shyu, 2013 
Assist the development of Will-cost estimates through CAPE,  Independent Cost Estimates, Department of the 
Army Service Cost Position (ACP), or Program Office Estimates (POE). Shyu, 2013 
Develop and have independent verification of will-cost estimates prior to milestone decisions for ACAT II and III 
programs. Shyu, 2013 
Input should-cost initiatives, exemptions, and margin release into the PARCA should-cost database by October 
each year and updated on a quarterly basis or when changes occur. PEO responsible for verifying the data 
entered. Shyu, 2013 
PMs shall input should-cost initiatives, exemptions, and margin release into the PARCA should-cost database by 
October each year and updated on a quarterly basis or when changes occur. If initiatives are captured as part of 
another effort such as Better Buying Power (BBP), value engineering change proposal (VECP) or Lean Six Sigma 
(LSS) then the user should indicated this where necessary. The PEO is responsible for verifying the data entered. Shyu, 2013 
Request margin release from the PEO through PARCA for withhold funding once initiatives have been successful 
and realized savings have occurred. Margin release will be allocated to fulfill unfunded requirements, to 
accelerate acquisition, and to fund cost reduction. Shyu, 2013 
PM are required to report on their should-cost targets and progress against those targets at Defense Acquisition 
Executive Summary (DAES) and Defense Acquisition Boards for MDAP programs. PMs will include in the plans of 
action and milestones for major Should-cost initiatives and their annual savings projected and realized. Shyu, 2013 
Provide Should-cost case studies to the PEO for submission to PARCA for review. PARCA will identify based on 
best practice, which case studies should be included in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) repository. Shyu, 2013 
Submit exemption requests to the PEO for programs that are not able to obtain Should-cost initiatives. There will 
be two categories that qualify a program for an exemption: If a program has less than 43M remaining per year or 
it is a joint program with another service as the executive agent. Shyu, 2013 
PMs will recertify exemption status quarterly. If any exemption changes, the PEO/PM must notify PARCA within 
30 days and must submit new exemption or initiative within 90 days if necessary. Shyu, 2013 - Business Rules
Develop inventive plans for PMs to reinforce and reward commitment to the Will-Cost and Should-Cost 
management process. Carter, 2011a
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additional guidance, and 2) the guidance is intentionally vague at the executive level so 
PMs can interpret the guidance to fit their specific programs within their current 
lifecycles. According to Kendall (2013c), “BBP 2.0, like BBP 1, is not rigid dogma – it is 
guidance subject to professional judgment” (p. 1). The guidance and tasks are important 
for successful implementation but do not motivate the workforce to achieve the “stretch” 
goals that are required of should-cost. That is where PM leadership comes in.    
 Leadership is the key element for implementing should-cost initiatives. 
Leadership and priority-setting are critical for PMs to implement should-cost practices 
into their programs. Leaders set the purpose and direction through a vision to their 
organizations. Leaders must set the tone and motivate their employees, as with our PM 
UAS example. Colonel Tim Baxter, PM UAS, said,  
I have challenged the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) leadership 
team to become experts in BBP and to continually to look for 
opportunities to improve program efficiencies. From our analysis, the 
Project Office has embraced the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
guidance on BBP across our programs. (Program Office Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems [PM UAS], 2012, p. 2)  
In the same article, COL Baxter further stated, “We have worked hard 
over the last year and half to instill a cost culture across the Project Office and have 
focused on controlling and reducing cost while providing best value to the warfighter” (p. 
2). COL Baxter’s emphasis and personal leadership has been instrumental in his 
organization’s implementation of SCM. Leadership is the key to any organizational 
change and is critical to adding SCM and cost consciousness into the organizational 
culture. Our analysis of the Army’s implementation of SCM leads us to the conclusion 
that leadership and culture will determine the future of SCM. 
b. Integrated Project Teams (IPT) 
Program Management IPTs form the nucleus of the personnel pillar of 
should-cost. Implementation of SCM takes trained professional personnel who are 
empowered to apply their skills effectively. The trained personnel are organized as 
members of IPTs. IPTs are diverse groups of people formed to accomplish any number of 
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tasks. IPTs consist of cross-functional team members from engineering, program 
management, contracting, and other disciplines involved in a program. IPTs have been in 
use with the government since the 1980s. IPTs were originally created to prevent 
“stovepiping” of organizational efforts and to create synergy in programs. In describing 
IPTs, the GAO (2001) stated, 
The essence of the IPT approach is to concentrate in a single 
organization the different areas of expertise needed to develop a 
product, together with the authority and responsibility to design, 
develop, test, and manufacture the product. ... Under the IPT approach, 
each team possesses the knowledge to collaboratively identify 
problems and propose solutions, minimizing the amount of rework that 
has to be done. When this knowledge is accompanied by the authority 
to make key product decisions, IPTs can make trade-offs between 
competing demands and more quickly make design changes, if 
necessary. (p. 11) 
IPTs evolved as a more holistic way of doing business that brought all 
representatives of the various stovepipes together. DoD defines three basic levels of IPTs 
for use in weapon system acquisitions: an overarching, working, and program level. The 
amount and type of IPTs depend on the complexity and scope of a given program. The 
more complex the program, the more IPTs it will typically have. Figure 15 shows the 
three levels of IPTs and their relationship. 
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 DoD IPT Levels (from Mitre, 2008, p. 9) Figure 15. 
IPTs are the ideal personnel organizations to implement SCM into a 
program. IPTs have the requisite knowledge and structure to perform the necessary 
planning and execution of should-cost initiatives. PM UAS and its multiple programs did 
not establish specific should-cost IPTs to implement the new business practice due to the 
scope of the challenge. It was determined that no single IPT could have the vision and 
oversight to manage all SCM initiatives. Instead, they tasked all of their collective IPTs, 
at all three levels, to conduct should-cost analysis and come up with initiatives to drive 
down costs. The PM UAS was responsible for coordinating across the IPTs to plan and 
execute initiatives that were determined to have a chance at success.  
PM UAS utilizes IPTs at the overarching, working, and program level. 
IPTs identified during our site visit were overarching level integration IPTs, Lean Six 
Sigma IPTs, Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) IPTs, program management IPTs, and 
Test and Evaluation IPTs. The IPTs were chartered and led by SMEs and PM leadership. 
Should-cost manufacturing was implemented by the IPTs across the board in all PM UAS 
IPTs.  
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No additional IPTs were created for should-cost implementation, but 
rather were taken on as an additional tasking by established IPTs. For example, we 
identified the use of a manufacturing IPT at the working level to negotiate the cost of 
recurring manufacturing costs on the Grey Eagle program. The manufacturing IPT 
consisted of Grey Eagle Product Office technical and logistic representatives as well as 
PM UAS Business Management, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), and Army 
Aviation and Missile Command representatives. The team collectively used its expertise 
to systematically scrutinize every element of program cost to remove unnecessary 
overhead and reoccurring manufacturing costs. The team’s strength was its ability to 
leverage its education and professional expertise to seek out non-value-added steps in the 
manufacturing process. Good SCM depends on the coordination and synchronization of 
the entire IPT to develop and execute initiatives. 
B. PROTOCOLS: THE SECOND PILLAR OF INTEGRATIVE SUCCESS 
The Protocols Pillar is defined by Yoder (2012) as “the statutes, regulations, 
policies, and business processes that allow acquisition to occur while adhering to 
standardized business rules with discretionary freedoms” (p. 60). Each of the protocols 
must provide a necessary function without hindrance to the others to allow SCM to be 
successful. During our research, we found many protocols that allow the Army SCM 
process to be successful. Will-cost and should-cost estimates begin the SCM process. The 
estimates are subject to many reviews in the DoD and ASA(ALT) forums and require 
specific reporting requirements. Additionally, PEO Aviation and each of the programs 
within the portfolio have established protocols to support their SCM initiative 
development and management. Each of the protocols this research has found work 
together towards the success of the Army’s SCM process. 
1. Will-Cost Estimate  
According to Shyu (2013), the should-cost estimate is an internal management 
tool for incentivizing performance to meet should-cost targets; therefore, should-cost 
estimates will not be used for budgeting, programming, or reporting outside of the DoD. 
Will-cost estimates are the official DoD program position for budgeting, programming, 
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and reporting (Shyu, 2013). The DoD will continue to utilize the will-cost estimates to set 
budget baselines based on Cost Assessment and Program Evaluations (CAPE), 
Independent Cost Estimates (ICE), Department of the Army Service Cost Positions 
(ACP), or Program Office Estimates (POE) to support ACAT I and II milestone decisions 
(Shyu, 2013). An ICE is an analysis, assessment, and quantification of all costs and risks 
associated with a program, based on programmatic and technical specifications, provided 
by the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluations (CAPE), to ensure that cost 
estimates for major programs are fair, reliable, and unbiased (WSARA, 2009). 
As part of the larger cost estimation process set into motion by Carter and later 
adopted by his successor, Kendall, the will-cost and SCM process is a “transparent, two 
tier cost, funding, and management approach using two separate cost estimates: a will 
cost for budgeting and a program should cost for program execution” (Shyu, 2013, 
Attachment 3, p. 1). The budget baseline is set by the will-cost estimate (i.e., CAPE, ICE, 
ACP, or POE) to execute the program. The will-cost estimate is selected by the MDA to 
essentially baseline the program and typically reflects the ACP or PEO-supported POE. 
According to Shyu (2013), “This results in the establishment of the approved will-cost 
baseline once the MDA approves the program budgeted cost at the Milestone” (p.4).  
For delegated ACAT II and III programs, the PM will obtain an independent 
verification through either an ICE or validation/verification of the POE. This will then be 
presented to the MDA for approval, thereby establishing the will-cost baseline. When a 
program modification or event occurs that significantly impacts the approved program 
baseline and the associated will-cost baseline (e.g., a JROC Tripwire process that results 
in a 5% before-unit cost breach), the PM will be expected to update his or her program 
office estimate (POE) and re-verify through the appropriate independent reviewer. Upon 
completion of these tasks, the PM will submit the updated documents to the MDA, who 
will approve the revised will-cost baseline. According to Shyu (2013), “The PM is 
encouraged to track interim changes to ensure that the underlying assumptions used in the 
will-cost baseline still exist when addressing potential savings in should-cost initiatives” 
(p. 5). 
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DoDI 5000.02 requires Service Cost Positions at all milestones and full rate 
production (FRP) decision reviews (OUSD[AT&L], 2008). The Army’s process for 
developing Cost Positions is referred to as the Army Cost Position (ACP). At each 
milestone, documentation to support the analysis is required as part of the milestone 
decision. As programs progress, certain required documents are developed and become 
available to the analyst. These documents can be used to produce cost estimates using 
conventional cost estimating methodologies. To properly cost out a program, detailed 
information and life-cycle cost data must be provided. The detailed information provided 
in the Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) provides a complete description 
of system costs.  
The current cost estimation process has program offices developing an estimate or 
POE internally and service cost centers also developing cost estimates separately. These 
estimates are built from the information provided in the CARD. Multiple estimates are 
useful in that the delta discovered through the process can provide decision-makers with 
information about program risks and uncertainties. The closer the estimates are to one 
another, the more confident one can be with the estimate. Estimates that are far apart 
usually equate to greater program risks (WSARA, 2009). PMs are recommended to 
provide draft copies of the CARD to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost 
and Economics (DASA-CE) and ASA(ALT) as soon as possible, but not later than the 
established timeline to ensure an ACP to support the milestone decision (WSARA, 2009). 
2. Should-Cost Reviews and Reports 
The various reviews and reports in the SCM process give the Army acquisition 
leadership the necessary tools to oversee the execution of SCM initiatives. SCM reviews 
and reports are required at the USD(AT&L) and ASA(ALT) levels. Leadership 
prioritization for SCM reviews and reports emphasizes the importance of the PMs 
establishing and executing SCM initiatives. 
a. OSD-Level Reviews 
OSD-level reviews are not a product of Army implementation of the SCM 
initiative. They are, however, a major element of the should-cost process for PMs of 
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ACAT I programs where the USD(AT&L) is the MDA. After initiation of the SCM 
initiative, Carter (2011a) directed that all PEOs and PMs report should-cost targets at 
DABs and Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) reviews. According to the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2011), the DAB is the senior level review forum used to 
assist the USD (AT&L) with his Title 10 responsibilities in oversight of ACAT ID and 
IAM programs. Most notably, the DAB conducts the review of the program at each of the 
program’s major milestones.  
Alternatively, the DAES is a monthly program review that allows the 
USD(AT&L) to review programs of his designation to identify issues in the program as 
early as possible (DoD, 2011). After a thorough review of all USD(AT&L) SCM policy 
letters, it is clear that failure to implement or execute SCM to satisfaction could spur a 
PEO or a PM to receive an invitation to present at a DAES review. 
In 2011, the Defense Advisory Board (DAB) Executive Secretary 
published a presentation template and guidance for use in the DAB and DAES. It was 
also recommended in this document for PMs of ACAT II and III programs to use this 
template to track and report their should-cost estimates (Spruill, 2011). The template 
provides a comprehensive look at the program over the current program objective 
memorandum (POM) years, where potential program should-cost initiatives are in each 
program phase, and a detailed slide on each of the should-cost initiatives complete with 
an estimate of expected cost savings. 
b. ASA(ALT) Reviews 
The AAE’s support of and dedication to the should-cost initiative is 
evident with the amount of leadership involvement in continual review of each program’s 
should-cost initiatives. Beginning with the Army’s initial should-cost implementation 
memo in 2011, the AAE added should-cost reviews at all milestone decisions and 
program reviews to programs of which she was the MDA (Shyu, 2011). Milestone 
decision reviews are processes mandated by law to be conducted for every program, and 
program reviews at the AAE level are similar to the DAES for the USD(AT&L). These 
two Army program review forums provide a consistent review of should-cost initiatives; 
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however, the length of time between reviews is different for each program. Because of 
this issue, the AAE has incorporated some additional, more frequent reviews to ensure 
continual compliance for the should-cost initiative. 
In the draft ASA(ALT) should-cost implementation memo, the AAE’s 
Principal Deputy is designated to conduct some should-cost reviews. According to the 
memo, The Principal Deputy will review updates to all should-cost initiatives, margin 
releases, and exempted programs on a monthly basis (Shyu, 2013). Any program that has 
requested a change to its approved should-cost targets, requested exemption from 
establishing should-cost targets, or requested utilization of the should-cost savings 
between the program’s will-cost and should-cost estimate will be reviewed. All of the 
information used in the monthly review will be taken from PARCA’s should-cost 
database that is populated by the PEO’s staff and the PMs.  
Additionally, ASA(ALT) will be required to report the same information 
from its monthly reviews to USD(AT&L) on a quarterly basis (Shyu, 2013). The 
Principal Deputy’s monthly review will allow the ASA(ALT) leadership a chance to 
review the data three times before the report to USD(AT&L), ensuring all programs are 
in compliance. Additionally, this review provides additional leadership emphasis at the 
Army level necessary to give the SCM initiative the ability to become part of the Army 
culture. 
c. Annual Reports 
As part of the USD(AT&L) implementation of SCM, Carter (2011a) 
directed CAEs to submit yearly progress reports on should-cost initiatives, with the first 
report submitted by November 1, 2011. This research did not uncover if any reports had 
been submitted by any of the services for FY2011. During our site visit to the 
Acquisition, Resource, and Analysis (ARA) office, a division under the USD(AT&L), 
our team did receive a copy of the Army’s 2012 should-cost progress report submission. 
Analysis of this document has helped lead us to the conclusion that the Army has done a 
thorough job of implementing the SCM initiative into its program management processes. 
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The Army’s 2012 report consists of three parts: actions taken by the Army 
to implement the SCM initiative; the Army’s should-cost lessons learned; and a thorough 
review of should-cost initiative results, successful and unsuccessful initiatives (Shyu, 
2012). The elements chosen as part of the progress report provide a clear picture of the 
Army’s SCM implementation efforts from the perspective of should-cost process 
implementation, execution, and results.  
The process implementation slide in the FY2012 report illustrates key 
actions that the Army PARCA office has completed to help ensure SCM success at the 
PEO and PM levels. Of note is the should-cost database creation, which is discussed later 
in this chapter, and the different forums created to assist with SCM education, 
implementation, and execution. Each action highlighted significantly contributes to the 
success of the SCM process.  
Lessons learned are a key asset to educating a group on actions taken that 
did not work in order to keep others from making the same mistakes. Alternatively, 
lessons learned should also be used to highlight successful activities in order to replicate 
best practices. The lessons learned slide in the FY2012 Progress Report of Should-Cost 
Management (Shyu, 2012) lists both types of lessons learned. Provided that this report 
was presented in a forum with the other CAEs in attendance, capturing of these lessons 
learned would achieve a high level of usefulness by providing ideas across the DoD to 
assist with its own service’s should-cost implementation.  
As part of the outcome of this research, we wish to promulgate best 
practices but also lessons learned to assist others with implementation of SCM. Some of 
the key lessons learned by the Army in FY2012 were 
- Will Cost estimates are based on best baseline at time of identification 
(e.g., APB, POM Lock, Presidential Budget) and must remain constant 
during reporting 
- Should Cost estimates directly relate to Will Cost baselines 
- PMs must participate in and support Should Cost analysis for O&S 
funding with their respective AMC/LCMC partners 
- CRAs and Withholds affect Should Cost initiatives. 
- Key to success = Leadership involvement and cross integration with 
the PEOs. (Shyu, 2012, p. 4) 
 70 
The last portion of the FY2012 annual report is the review of initiative 
results. The results overview slide shows projected savings from SCM initiatives from 
the start of the year compared to the actual savings realized at the end of the year and 
categorizes the initiatives into four areas: no savings, partial savings, total expected 
savings, and achieved more than expected savings (Shyu, 2012). The information that 
populates the overview comes from separate ACAT slides. Under each ACAT, the PEOs 
are listed along with the total number of programs from the PEO in that ACAT, and how 
many have waivers from conducting SCM. The results section overall provides a good 
picture of successful and unsuccessful should-cost programs and how the Army has done 
with executing should-cost over the previous year. 
3. Margin Withholds 
The definition of a margin in the Army’s implementation of SCM is the 
difference in the amount of money between the will-cost estimate and the should-cost 
estimate (Mullins, 2011). The margin withhold is the actual process of holding the 
margin at the MDA authority level and not distributing it down to the PM, helping to 
enforce the management of the program to the should-cost level. Shyu (2013) directs that 
ACAT I programs and any program where the AAE is the MDA will have their margin 
withheld at the service level, whereas ACAT II and III programs will be withheld at the 
PEO level when they are the MDA. 
During our site visit to ASA(ALT), we observed the should-cost database in use. 
Inside the should-cost database is the Margin Release Request Form (Figure 16). The 
margin release form is to be filled out and submitted any time that margins withheld are 
being requested to be utilized. Policy established by Shyu (2013) allows margins to be 
released and utilized to “fulfill unfunded requirements, accelerate acquisition, and to fund 
cost reduction” (p. 2). This Army policy supports Kendall’s (2013c) should-cost guidance 
where components have the latitude to apply should-cost savings to priority unfunded 
requirements or reinvest the savings within the same program. 
The PARCA office is charged with oversight of the margin releases and submits a 
consolidated monthly report to the Principal Deputy and the AAE showing margin 
releases (Shyu, 2013). Figure 16 is a sample of the Margin Release Request Form in the 
Army’s Should-Cost Database. 
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 Army Margin Release Request Form (from ASA[ALT], 2013) Figure 16. 
As part of the Army’s implementation of SCM, a waiver process was developed 
to exempt certain PMs from the requirement to report SCM to the AAE. The program 
must meet certain stringent criteria to be considered for a waiver. The current AAE’s 
policy has two categories for waivers: (1) a program has less than $3M per year 
remaining in its budget, or (2) the program is a joint program with another service as the 
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executive agent (Shyu, 2013). It is worth noting that programs that fall into the second 
category will report their should-cost initiatives in accordance with that CAE’s policy. 
The process of requesting a waiver begins with the PM office filling out a waiver 
request form from the Army’s Should-Cost Database (Figure 17). The waiver request 
requires the concurrence of the PEO, the PARCA office, and final approval of the AAE 
to be established as a waiver program. According to the Army’s should-cost 
implementation guidance, supporting documentation to justify the waiver request should 
be submitted with the waiver request (Shyu, 2013). The waiver will be reviewed by the 
Principal Deputy at the monthly review sessions to receive approval. Figure 17 is a 
sample of the Waiver Request Form in the Army’s Should-Cost Database. 
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 Army Waiver Request Form (from ASA[ALT], 2013) Figure 17. 
4. Should-Cost Performance Incentives 
According to Kendall, “The key to should cost management is to seek out and 
eliminate, through discrete actions, low-value added ingredients of program cost and to 
appropriately reward those who succeed in doing this, both in government and in 
industry” (2013, Attachment 2, p. 2). For the PM, the reward could be professional 
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recognition or an additional resource that becomes available due to SCM that enhances 
the PM’s program by freeing up funds to buy more equipment for the warfighters. For the 
Army, the reward for SCM could be available funding to apply towards other pressing 
concerns. For industry, the reward could be in the form of greater profit sharing for 
overall cost reductions (Kendall, 2013).  
As part of BBP 2.0 (2013), incentivizing productivity and innovation in industry 
and government is a big factor in the overall should-cost implementation theme. As such, 
Kendall detailed in his implementation directive for BBP 2.0 some general guidelines and 
also specific actions he wanted taken by various organizations under his direct 
supervision (Kendall, 2013). Kendall stated,  
Profit is the key lever in motivating contractors to perform in 
alignment with DoD goals. The defense industrial base must be 
profitable or there will not be a defense industrial base, but the profits 
DoD provides should be consistent with the risks industry takes and 
the return needed to attract the required capital to defense companies. 
(2013, Attachment 2, p. 7)  
This is a very powerful statement that shows the delicate balancing act the DoD 
must undertake in order to ensure not only that the Army get the most “bang for our 
buck” in terms of taxpayer dollars, but also that our defense industry makes enough profit 
to stay viable. 
Kendall also emphasized that current profit levels, in the aggregate, are 
reasonable but they are not linked enough to successful performance in meeting the goals 
of the DoD (Kendall, 2013). He further stated,  
DoD profit policy and our acquisition strategies should provide 
effective incentives to industry to deliver cost-effective solutions in 
which realized profitability is aligned and consistent with contract 
outcomes … Incentive structures will provide opportunities for 
companies to realize profits above or below the levels defined in the 
weighted guidelines based on their performance at achieving specific 
goals of importance to the Department” (Kendall, Attachment 2, 
p. 7–8). 
Another key aspect to incentivizing the contractor is to institute a DoD-wide 
superior supplier incentive program (SSIP). This initiative was first introduced in BBP 
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1.0, but was not completed. According to Kendall (2013), the intent of the SSIP is to 
publicly recognize and reward top performing defense contractors. The Navy was 
developing a pilot program at the start of 2013, and if successful, will be expanded to a 
DoD-wide program in 2014. The SSIP will grant a Superior Supplier Status (SSS) rating 
to businesses that have demonstrated outstanding performance at the unit level in the 
areas of quality, business relations, cost, schedule, and performance. The SSS rating will 
give contractors more favorable contract terms and conditions in their defense contracts 
(Kendall, 2013).  
In addition, corporations with several business units achieving SSS ratings may 
receive recognition at the corporate level (Kendall, 2013). The Navy’s SSIP will use the 
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) as the medium for data 
collection and assess contractors in the following areas: (1) technical; (2) schedule; (3) 
cost control; (4) management responsiveness; (5) management of key personnel; (6) 
utilization of small business; and other CPARS factors as deemed appropriate (Kendall, 
2013, Attachment 2). The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (ASD[A]) will 
work with the SAEs and DPAP to assess the implementation of the pilot program and 
make recommendations to the Business Senior Integration Group (BSIG) by January 1, 
2014 (Kendall, 2013).  
According to Kendall (2013b) the DoD will also implement PBL strategies that 
provide financial incentives to industry to deliver reliability and availability to the DoD at 
a reduced total cost by rewarding innovative cost reduction initiatives. However, PBL’s 
success hinges on ensuring that the workforce has the expertise and support to properly 
develop and execute the PBL arrangements. To this end, the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (ASD[L&MR]) will develop a 
comprehensive “PBL Best Practices Guidebook” that should be used as the source for 
PBL by December 1, 2013. The DAU will also incorporate PBL into the Life Cycle 
Logistics, PM, Contracting, and Systems Engineering curricula by December 1, 2013.  
At PEO Aviation, numerous efficiency initiatives that are specifically designed to 
incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and government alike have been 
executed. Figures 18 and 19 are examples of some PEO Aviation initiatives that were 
briefed at the DAES in February 2013. Cost savings projected or achieved have been 
removed for public release.  
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 PEO Aviation Incentive Initiative 1 of 2 (from PEO Aviation, 2013) Figure 18. 
 
 PEO Aviation Incentive Initiatives 2 of 2 (from PEO Aviation, 2013) Figure 19. 
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5. PM UAS Should-Cost Management Process  
Should-cost target development begins with leadership and the establishment of a 
will-cost baseline. As discussed previously, the will-cost baseline can be either the ICE, 
ACP, POE, or an estimate determined by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). The 
will-cost estimate will continue to be used for budgeting in the President’s Budget. 
However, our research has shown that realized should-cost savings could eventually 
become the adjusted will-cost estimate as seen in the MQ-1C Grey Eagle program. In the 
Grey Eagle, the Army Cost Position eventually became the new will-cost as the program 
matured.  
PM UAS implemented should-cost based on the guidance from the AAE and 
leadership direction from the PEO. No further guidance was given by the PEO outside of 
the AAE’s guidance. Specific actions taken by PM UAS for implementation were (1) 
emphasize leadership and set goals, (2) establish affordability goals and a will-cost 
estimate, (3) use program IPTs to develop should-cost initiatives using acquisition best 
practices based on the product and lifecycle (this must be determined through careful 
analysis of underlying cost drivers and professional judgment), (4) execute the program 
through specific actions to the should-cost targets; track and report initiatives to the 
should-cost data base and higher HQ as required, and (5) track performance and conduct 
After Action Reviews (AARs) of what worked and did not work. The overarching goal of 
the should-cost process is to reduce lifecycle costs by “beating the ICE.” Figure 20 
depicts PM UAS five-step Should-Cost Methodology. 
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 PM UAS Should-Cost Methodology Figure 20. 
6. Should-Cost Management Initiative Best Practices  
This section provides an overview of selected SCM initiative best practice 
examples from PEO Aviation that were successful in realizing savings or cost avoidance. 
The programs portrayed below used multiple kinds of SCM initiatives based on the 
program’s acquisition life-cycle phase. Initiatives used in one phase of the life cycle 
might not work in another phase. For example, strategies like working to reduce 
engineering design costs used prior to Milestone A would not be applicable during the 
EMD phase and vice versa.  
SCM best practices employ numerous business strategies that are targeted to each 
program. The should-cost business practices we found during our site visit were not new 
or revolutionary to the acquisition workforce. There were no “silver bullet” tricks to 
achieving should-cost savings, and each program must be analyzed and evaluated based 
on multiple factors. However, the should-cost initiatives applied across the life cycle 
represent a new, holistic way of reducing program costs. Cost-saving initiatives such as 
value engineering change proposal (VECP) and incentive-based contracting have long 
been part of the PM’s tool kit, but they were applied at the convenience of the PM. What 
makes should-cost initiatives different than past acquisition efforts is the whole–life-cycle 
 79 
approach to reducing non–value-added costs yet adding value to the warfighter. In 
essence, a PM’s should-cost targets are a promise to the warfighter and the taxpayer that 
their equipment will be affordable and meet their requirements. 
PEO Aviation and PM UAS have planned and implemented many successful 
should-cost initiatives across their portfolio. Figure 21 provides an overview of PM UAS 
BBP 2.0 initiatives that include should-cost initiatives. 
 
 BBP 2.0 Initiatives (from PM UAS, 2013) Figure 21. 
a. Recurring Manufacturing Cost 
In FY 2011, PM UAS–MQ-1C Grey Eagle Product Team developed a 
should-cost target to reduce recurring manufacturing costs. The manufacturing IPT 
consisted of the Grey Eagle Product Office technical and logistic representatives as well 
as PM UAS Business Management, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), and Army 
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Aviation and Missile Command representatives. Recurring manufacturing costs are 
incurred in a repeating fashion over the life cycle of the product. The FAR defines 
recurring costs as “costs that vary with the quantity being produced, such as labor and 
materials” (FAR 17.103, 2013). The team’s initial goal of the initiative was to reduce the 
cost by an average 2% per year in preparation of the FY 2012 production buy. The 
initiatives were based on the assumptions that acquisition funding would remain stable, 
there would be no Continuing Resolution Agreement (CRA), and the schedule would be 
unchanged (PM UAS, 2012).  
The manufacturing IPT of the Grey Eagle program developed its should-
cost target based off of technical evaluations on the recurring manufacturing costs with 
an emphasis on learning curves of both touch and support labor. The manufacturing IPT 
and the prime contractor worked together to monitor and control manufacturing metrics. 
The work entailed significant face-to-face fact finding in the manufacturing facilities with 
the prime and major subcontractors. For example, the concept was also used during the 
LRIP II negotiations, resulting in a reduction of 15,832 hours. The team’s efforts 
culminated in March 2012 with the awarding of the LRIP III contract. The team 
successfully negotiated a price that was 2%, or $13.08 million, in realized should-cost 
savings. In addition, the PM expects a cost avoidance of $9 million from FY 2013–2015 
(PM UAS, 2012). 
b. Value Engineering Change Proposal  
VECP is a cost reduction method that has been increasingly used across 
the DoD due to reduced defense budgets and sequestration. A VECP is a proposal that is 
submitted by the contractor under the Value Engineering provisions of the FAR Part 
52.248-1 and codified in U.S.C. 432. VECP clauses are found in every contract, 
including services and performance-based. The program is intended to incentivize 
contractors and government program office personnel to reduce costs, increase quality, 
and improve mission capability. The following list from the DAU’s (2013) ACQuipedia 
lists VECP suggestions by life-cycle phase: 
1) Value Engineering (VE) in Materiel Solution Analysis 
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VE can have a significant role in the systems engineering activities 
during Materiel Solution Analysis. The analysis of alternatives and 
associated cost-effectiveness studies can use VE to analytically 
evaluate functions and provide a mechanism to analyze the essential 
requirements and develop possible alternatives offering improved 
value. 
2) Value Engineering (VE) in Technology Development 
In support of the process to transition technology from the technology 
base into program-specific, preliminary, design efforts, VE can be 
used to analyze the value of each requirement and the specifications 
derived from it by comparing function, cost, and worth. 
3) Value Engineering (VE) in Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development 
As part of the development and refinement of the functional baseline, 
VE should be used for: 1) identifying the necessary top-level functions 
for each of the missions considered, 2) identifying technical 
approaches (i.e., design concept) to the missions, 3) identifying 
necessary lower level functions for each technical approach (the value 
engineer should place emphasis on eliminating unnecessary design 
restrictive requirements), 4) evaluating each function in terms of 
technical feasibility, and 5) estimating the cost of various functions. 
4) Value Engineering (VE) in Production and Deployment 
VE contributes to the systems engineering activities during production 
and deployment by devising alternative means for achieving required 
functions and developing alternative designs to meet functional needs. 
VE has been extensively applied to evaluate and improve 
manufacturing processes, methods, and materials. 
5) Value Engineering (VE) in Operations and Support 
After fielding, opportunities for VE may exist for a long time. Product 
life cycles are being extended; for consumables, there is no sure way 
to determine the total quantity that will be purchased. Also, in the past, 
many items that entered the defense inventory were never subjected to 
a VE analysis. The potential for VE savings on these items is real. 
Advances in technology or changes in user requirements provide a 
basis for potential savings. (www.dap.dau.mil/acquipedia) 
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A VECP can be applied very early in a program’s life through 
sustainment. Figure 22 depicts the VECP flow from the contractor through life-cycle 
reductions and increased profits for the contractor. 
 
 VECP Process Diagram (from PM UAS, 2012)  Figure 22. 
PM UAS, Technical Management Division (TMD) is applying the VECPs 
across the PM portfolio as should-cost initiatives. PM UAS recognized that VECPs have 
many benefits to both warfighters and the contractor. Contractors can receive a percentage 
of savings from 25 to 75% that result from their VECP for a period of three to five years. 
The government also benefits from the savings and improvement to the system process, 
and the PM can use the savings pending a successful marginal request waiver. TMD has 
found it beneficial to educate the PM shop as well as the prime contractors on the VECP 
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process. Education and communication across the various IPTs generates VECP. For 
example, PM UAS (2012) received and processed two VECPs in FY 2012. The two 
proposals equaled $2.5 million in realized savings and a potential of $10 million in cost 
avoidance. The two proposals were successful and contributed to the overall should-cost 
success. PM UAS is pushing for more VECPs across its portfolio as it refines and expands 
its should-cost initiatives. VECPs represent a win-win for the contractor and government, 
and additional emphasis should be placed on the technique (PM UAS, 2012). 
c. Government-Furnished Equipment  
Providing government-furnished equipment (GFE) is another SCM 
strategy. The provision of GFE to prime vendors reduces non-productive processes and 
unnecessary overhead and promotes competition. Prime vendors are provided major end 
items that are procured from various sources to be integrated by the prime vendor. The 
items may even be the design of the prime vendor but competed in full and open 
competition given that the government has the data rights. PM UAS utilizes this strategy 
on most of its programs. The strategy has resulted in savings of 8% of its Fiscal Year 
2009–2012 procurement funding of the One System Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT) 
Rover transceiver (PM UAS, 2012). The strategy promotes real competition within a 
program because multiple contracts for GFE means more opportunities for the industrial 
base. The expanded opportunities cut cost through competition and expand the supplier 
base. Programs must conduct CBAs to determine if buying the data rights and using GFE 
strategies are worth the cost. 
d. Leveraging Similar Technological Efforts: Universal Ground 
Control Station  
Leveraging technology across similar programs is another strategy used to 
reduce costs. PM UAS leveraged technology from its Shadow Universal Ground Control 
Station (UGCS) and applied it on the Grey Eagle system. The UGCS was developed by 
PM Shadow to control its air vehicle from a portable shelter. The Grey Eagle PM IPT 
coordinated with PM Shadow to share information and technology on the control station. 
PM Shadow even supplied the initial UGCS to accelerate testing and to prove out 
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software on the Grey Eagle. The two UAV systems requirements for a ground control 
system were found to be compatible, and one control system could be used. The resulting 
savings was $20 million just from leveraging cross-product technology. The cross-
product coordination resulted in should-cost savings, eliminated redundancy in control 
stations, and will reduce sustainment costs across the life cycle (PM UAS, 2012).  
e. Multi-Year Contracts 
PM Cargo executed a firm fixed price (FFP), multi-year sole source 
contract, funded for five years for up to 215 CH-47F aircrafts on 15 May 2013. The 
contract resulted in a cost savings of $534 million on the base contract and $181 million 
and $217 million on two option years. The overall cost savings was $932 million for FY 
2013–2019, with deliveries starting in FY 2014 (U.S. Army Contracting Command, 
2013). 
7. Unsuccessful Initiatives 
Unsuccessful initiatives are inevitable when implementing a new process. SCM 
implementation is no different, and has had its share of initiatives that were not 
successful. SCM initiative success or failure is not documented well or distributed across 
the acquisition workforce. The DAU has been tasked to collect lessons learned and best 
practices from the field but has not complied its results as of writing this report. In 
addition to the DAU’s work, the SCM database has data entry tabs for lessons learned in 
each documented SCM initiative. During our site visit with PARCA, we found no 
evidence that the SCM database lessons learned data was being used or distributed. No 
unsuccessful initiatives were discovered during our site visit to PEO Aviation. This is not 
saying there were not any, but none were reported or documented. However, we did 
discover two unsuccessful initiatives in the Army Annual FY12 Progress Report of SCM 
Programs (Shyu, 2012). 
The first unsuccessful initiative came from the PEO Soldier–M2A1 QCB Kit 
initiative. The projected savings for the initiative was $2.3 million. The result was not 
achieved because of the lack of competition among suppliers. The M2 machine gun has 
been in service for over 50 years, and most sustainment is done at unit and depot level. 
 85 
The PMO should-cost savings initiative was dependent on a competitive solicitation. 
Furthermore, the PM also assumed no additional costs for implementation of a second 
source. Finally, the lack of qualified vendors degraded the PMO’s ability to lower costs 
through competition (Shyu, 2012).  
The second unsuccessful initiative came from PEO C3T – Advanced Field 
Artillery Tactical Defense System (AFATADS). The AFATDS is a battle command 
system to coordinate land and air indirect fire systems. The projected savings of the 
initiative was $2.52 million. The result of the initiative was a partial savings of $1.60 
million. The PMO’s strategy was based on competition of the software development 
efforts. Actual competition was less than expected, and only partial savings were realized 
(Shyu, 2012). 
C. PLATFORMS: THE THIRD PILLAR OF INTEGRATIVE SUCCESS 
Platforms are the Third Pillar of Integrative Success for the Army’s SCM process. 
Platforms are defined by Yoder (2012) as “the hardware and software systems needed to 
efficiently capture, analyze, and disseminate information necessary to manage critical 
aspects of programs and contracts in support of acquisitions” (p. 57). This report does not 
review the many different platforms that are currently in use in the acquisition area. 
Instead, we limited our research in this pillar to new platforms introduced by the Army to 
assist with the execution of the SCM process. During our site visit to ASA(ALT), we 
uncovered a new database that the Army has built, called the Should-Cost/Will-Cost 
Database. The database is a key component in the Army’s SCM process success. As the 
Army continues to enhance and upgrade the functionality of the fledgling should-cost 
database, the Army’s ability to manage the should-cost process will become easier.  
The Army completes a thorough implementation of the SCM initiative by creating 
the Third Pillar of Integrative Success, Platforms, in the establishment of the Army 
Should-Cost/Will-Cost Database. This database works in harmony with the Personnel 
and Protocol pillars and provides a critical SCM link between the PMs and the 
ASA(ALT) PARCA office. The database is a great asset in assisting the PARCA office 
with its responsibilities to collect, track, analyze, and report should-cost initiatives. The 
 86 
database is also the key in assisting PMs in the fulfillment of their USD(AT&L) directive 
to “develop, own, track, and report against Should-Cost estimates” (Carter, 2011a, p. 1). 
During our site visit to ASA(ALT), we were able to observe all aspects of the database 
being used, as well as gain access to a test database to acquire screenshots of the database 
for use in this report.  
The current database is designed using Microsoft Access and has login and 
password protection. Once logged in to the database, the individual is able to see only the 
data in which he or she has authority to see; the PM can only see his or her program 
information, while the PEO can see each program under his or her authority but not any 
other program. This feature is needed because of sensitive program information in the 
database. However, this makes information sharing for the purposes of exchanging 
lessons learned more difficult.  
The initial screen takes the user to a dashboard. The dashboard is a summary of 
the PEO’s or PM’s should-cost initiatives presented by ACAT and can be printed or 
added to a slide for a quick presentation of the program’s should-cost initiatives. Figure 
23 is an example of a PM’s dashboard. Along the left of the dashboard are the user 
interface buttons.  
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 Army Should-Cost/Will-Cost Database Dashboard (from ASA[ALT], 2013) Figure 23. 
The Manage Program Data interface button allows the user to see all of his or her 
program data on one screen: program summary, Presidential Budget data, will-cost 
estimate data, and a summary of initiatives displaying should-cost projections. This 
interface allows a PM to easily develop and track the progress of his or her should-cost 
initiatives, which is one of the USD(AT&L) directives. Figure 24 is an example of the 
Program Information interface in the database. 
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 Army Should-Cost/Will-Cost Database Manage Program Information Figure 24. 
(from ASA[ALT], 2013) 
From the Manage Program Information screen, the PM can manipulate the 
database to add all information relevant to the program and its should-cost management 
initiatives. One thing of note about the initiatives data, there is a dropdown to state if the 
initiative was successful, partially successful, or not successful. If unsuccessful, there is 
an area to state why the initiative was not successful. Figure 25 is a screenshot of the 
Initiative Qualitative Information screen illustrating the various inputs for should-cost 
initiatives into the database. 
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 Army Should-Cost/Will-Cost Database Initiative Qualitative Information Figure 25. 
(from ASA[ALT], 2013) 
The database has been designed to assist with the various reporting requirements 
of SCM to both the USD(AT&L) reviews and the AAE’s reviews. All should-cost 
reporting requirements of the PEO, PM and PARCA are easily completed from the 
Report Management dashboard. With the click of a mouse, an un-editable PDF version of 
a PowerPoint slide is generated from the data in the database in the format required by 
the review forum. Being unable to edit the product after it is produced forces a 
requirement to ensure the database is accurate and up to date. Figure 26 is an example of 
the Report Management dashboard in the database.  
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 Army Should-Cost Database Report Management (from ASA[ALT], 2013) Figure 26. 
The Army’s Should-Cost/Will-Cost Database is an invaluable asset in the Army’s 
SCM process. The platform provides a critical link between the PM and PARCA office 
and provides assistance for each office to execute its duties and responsibilities in the 
should-cost process. With program information in the database containing sensitive 
information, a login and password are used to gain access to the PM’s or PEO’s 
individual information. However, sharing lessons learned across the Army on why 
program initiatives were or were not successful is made more difficult by this feature. 








The formalization of the SCM process is an attempt to force implementation of 
cost-saving practices, enforce the execution of SCM initiatives throughout a program’s 
life cycle, and ingrain into the minds of the acquisition workforce a culture that is always 
cost conscious. Our research uncovered nothing new or revolutionary about SCM and the 
business practices required to realize cost savings in an acquisition program. SCM is not 
a new concept; it is simply good old-fashioned frugality and being good stewards of the 
taxpayers’ money.  
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, DoD spending increased 
drastically as the focus shifted to the GWOT and providing the necessary capabilities to 
the warfighter as quickly as possible. As a result, acquisition inefficiencies mounted and 
disciplined spending degraded. With the BBPi and more specifically, SCM, we are 
pivoting back towards being a cost-conscious workforce. In this final chapter, we address 
the research questions we set out to find answers to, summarize our findings, make 
recommendations for should-cost process improvement, identify areas ripe for further 
research, and conclude with our final thoughts.  
A. SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS AND CONCISE RESEARCH 
We address the following primary and secondary research questions: 
Question 1: How has the Army implemented SCM as part of BBPi? 
This question is our primary research question and we present our findings and 
analysis to answer this question in great detail in Chapter IV. To present and analyze how 
the Army implemented SCM, we used Yoder’s (2012) TIPS model. The model uses three 
integrated pillars that work in harmony towards the success of a system: Personnel, 
Protocols, and Platforms. Figure 27 is a complete illustration of the SCM TIPS model. 
The SCM personnel pillar is made up of the personnel who have duties and 
responsibilities in the Army’s SCM process. Beginning with the PM and proceeding up to 
the USD(AT&L), along with various DoD-level agencies and industry partners, the SCM 
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process does not succeed without each individual executing his or her specific should-
cost function. The PM has personnel who define should-cost targets, track their 
implementation, and report their progress. Additionally, the PEO has personnel to track 
and report all should-cost targets and their progress to the ASA(ALT) PARCA office. 
The PARCA office collects, tracks, analyzes, and reports all should-cost initiatives to the 
AAE and USD(AT&L), which oversee the successful completion of the SCM process.  
The SCM protocols pillar is primarily made up of the business rules and 
processes necessary to execute SCM. The Army SCM process leadership has 
implemented many protocols to ensure the success of the SCM process. The will-cost 
estimate is the starting point from which a PM executes should-cost target development. 
The should-cost targets use should-cost initiatives, or business strategies, to achieve 
savings below the will-cost estimate. The dollar amount between the will-cost and 
should-cost estimate is known as the margin withhold, and is withheld by the program’s 
MDA. If a program meets certain requirements, the PM can request the AAE to grant a 
program waiver and be exempt from the SCM process. All programs not exempt from 
executing SCM must conduct periodic reviews and reports of their SCM initiative 
progress.  
The platforms pillar is all of the hardware and software tools necessary for the 
SCM process to be successful. This research did not examine the many different 
platforms already in use by the acquisition community. Instead, we focused our study on 
the new system developed by the Army to assist with SCM, the Army Will-Cost/Should-
Cost Database. This standalone Microsoft access database possesses the ability to 
perform all mandatory functions of SCM: develop, own track, and report SCM initiatives. 
The SCM database is password protected to ensure that the person accessing the database 
has the authority to see the program data. A PEO may see all programs under his or her 
command, but a PM will only see his or her program. The database also has an 
import/export function to facilitate the transfer of updated program data to the database 
owners in the PARCA office. This database works in harmony with the other pillars of 
the SCM process. Upgrading the system to a web-based system capable of interacting 
with and receiving data from the other acquisitions platforms would help improve and 
simplify the SCM process. 
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 Army’s Should-Cost Management Three Pillars of Integrative Success Figure 27. 
Question 2: What are the directives related to SCM from the BBPi from the 
OSD, Army, and PEO?  
To answer this question, we conducted an extensive literature review that 
involved reviewing all BBPi directives flowing down from the OSD to the Army, Army 
to PEOs, and PEOs to PMs, and extracting the directives that specifically addressed 
SCM. We presented our findings in Chapter II. Additionally, we conducted site visits of 
key organizations within the SCM chain to gather additional data to fill gaps in our 
understanding. Through our detailed literature review and site visits, we learned that 
BBPi and SCM are continually evolving as implementation is refined over time. Both 
initiatives have also grown substantially more important in the minds of all acquisition 
professionals from the OSD to PMs and other external organizations such as the DAU.  
As a response to unsustainable cost growths in major DoD weapons programs, 
acquisitions, and contracts, Carter issued his Better Buying Power: Guidance for 
Obtaining Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending memo on September 
14, 2010. In this memo, Carter (2010b) directed the implementation of SCM as part of 
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the greater BBPi to ensure PEOs and PMs were incorporating SCM initiatives in their 
programs (Carter, 2010b). In April 2011, Carter (2011a), published his Implementation of 
will-cost and should-cost management memo that directed should-cost estimates for all 
ACAT programs and made it a requirement for PEOs and PMs to brief SCM initiatives at 
all milestone reviews. Carter also directed PMs to develop, own, track, and report on 
should-cost estimates annually. In addition, SAEs were directed to track and report on 
their realized should-cost savings and to have the data validated by their respective 
Service’s Assistant Secretary for Financial Management and Comptroller (FM&C).  
In November 2012, Frank Kendall, Carter’s successor, published his updated 
version of BBPi, which he titled, Better Buying Power 2.0: Continuing the Pursuit for 
Greater Efficiency and Productivity in Defense Spending. In this update, Kendall (2012) 
modified Carter’s original 23 points into 36 initiatives broken down into seven key areas. 
These modifications were based on lessons learned over the two years of BBPi’s 
existence. Kendall stressed that BBPi, as well as SCM, was to be viewed as a 
management philosophy and that the culture of the acquisition workforce had to change. 
The original goal of BBP 2.0 remained unchanged.  
For the Army, Shyu (2011) directed that all should-cost targets for ACAT I - II 
programs for which the AAE is the MDA will be approved by the AAE. Shyu provided 
further directives and guidance on margin withholds, waiver requests, and reporting 
requirements to PEOs and PMs. Tables 6 through 8 are a compilation of all should-cost 
guidance and directives for the OSD, AAE, PEOs, and PMs. 
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Table 6.   Official Should-Cost Guidance or Tasking for ASA(ALT) 
Office of 
Responsibility
Should-cost Guidance or Tasking Document Source
AAE
- Effective November 15, 2010, establish should-cost targets as management tools for all ACAT I 
programs as they are considered for major Milestone Decisions
- By January 1, 2011, establish should-cost estimates for ACAT II and III programs as they are considered 
for MS decisions. 
Carter, 2010c (directed 
implementation); Carter, 2011a 
(reinforced implementation)
AAE Send an annual report of Should-cost progress beginning in November 2011. Carter, 2011a
AAE
Develop inventive plans for PMs to reinforce and reward commitment to the Will-Cost and Should-cost 
management process. Carter, 2011a
AAE
Should-cost targets for ACAT I programs and ACAT II programs that the AAE is the MDA for will be 
approved by the AAE. Shyu, 2011
AAE/PEO/PM
ACAT I through III programs should have should-cost targets in place by August 1, 2013, or the next 
milestone decision, whichever comes first. Kendall, 2013b
AAE/PEO
An acquisition manager's performance evaluation should consider effective cost control, including 
implementation of should-cost management. Kendall, 2013b
AAE
DAU will work with component acquisition executives (CAEs) to collect successful should-cost studies 
and lessons learned. Kendall, 2013b
AAE
Regardless of lifecycle phase, implement should-cost management into all ACAT I, IA, II and III 
programs. Kendall, 2013c
AAE / PEO
CAEs and PEOs will: 1) review and approve Should-cost targets, 2)monitor progress, and 3) direct or 
recommend allocation of realized cost savings as appropriate. Kendall, 2013c
AAE Determine own reporting requirements for effective Should-cost management oversight Kendall, 2013c
PARCA 
(Collect / Track)
Initial and updated Will-cost estimates and Should-cost estimates must be provided to the Army DASA 
(PPR) PARCA office… Shyu 2011; Shyu 2013
PARCA 
(Collect / Track)
Receive notification letters from PEOs when updates to approved Should-cost estimates are made to 
ACAT II and III programs where the PEO is the MDA. Shyu 2011
PARCA 
(Collect / Track) Collect and process Should-cost estimate requirement waiver requests Shyu 2011
PARCA 
(Collect / Track) Receive monthly reports from PEOs on any release of delta dollars (margin withholds) Shyu 2011
PARCA 
(Collect / Track) Track the execution of margin release Shyu 2013
PARCA 
(Collect / Track)
PEOs are required to use the PARCA developed Should-cost database to capture information on their 
initiatives, exemptions, and margin releases. Shyu 2013
PARCA 
(Collect / Track)
Collect should-cost case studies from PEOs and identify based on best practices, which should be 
included in the DAU repository. Shyu 2013
PARCA 
(Analyze)
Delegated review authority for all initiatives, exemptions, and margin release. PARCA will report 
updates to the Principle Deputy on a monthly basis. Shyu 2013
PARCA
(Report)
Present Should-cost management waiver requests to the Principal Deputy for approval during the 
monthly reviews. Shyu 2013
PARCA
(Report)
Send a consolidated report to the ASA(ALT) showing programs using dollars within the delta between 
the Will-cost and Should-cost estimates. Shyu 2011
PARCA
(Report) Prepare reports that will be presented based on inputs into the Should-cost database. Shyu 2013
PARCA
(Report)
Beginning 01 August 2013, report total active ACAT I, II and III programs, programs with and without 
should-cost initiatives, and the number of requirement waivers: 1) monthly to the Principal Deputy and 
2) quarterly to OSD Shyu 2013
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Table 7.   Official Should-Cost Guidance and Taskings for PEOs 
PEO Function Should-cost Guidance or Tasking Document Source
PEO
PEOs will ensure PMs implement Should-cost management by identifying opportunities for savings and 
developing Should-cost estimates for their ACAT I, II, and III programs. Beginning in FY 2014, Should-cost 
management objectives will be included in Acquisition Managers employee contribution planning and Officer's 
major performance objectives Shyu, 2013 
PEO
PEO managed ACAT II and III programs will continue to develop and have independent verification of Will-cost 
estimates prior to milestone decision Shyu, 2013 
PEO
PEOs are required to use the PARCA developed Should-cost database to capture information on their initiatives, 
exemptions, and margin release. Initiatives and exemptions are to be entered into the database by October of 
each FY and updated on a quarterly basis or when program changes occur. Margin releases are expected to be 
entered once the initiative has been successful and the PEOs are requesting the withhold Shyu, 2013 
PEO
PEOs and PMs are required to report on their cost target and progress against those targets, plans of action, 
milestones for major Should-cost initiatives, and their savings projected and realized Shyu, 2013 
PEO
PEOs will include in their DAES briefings, metrics addressing how Should-cost has been implemented within their 
portfolios, incentive and recognition mechanisms in place, and lessons learned Shyu, 2013 
PEO
PEOs are required to submit an exemption for programs that are not able to obtain an initiative. There are two 
categories that qualify a program for an exemption: program has less than $3M remaining per year or it is a joint 
program with another Service as the executive agent Shyu, 2013 
PEO
PEOs will withhold the difference between the funds distributed and the program budget baseline for programs 
for which they are the MDA; margin releases will be allocated to fulfill unfunded requirements, to accelerate 
acquisition, and to fund cost reduction. PEOs are required to complete margin release forms that will identify the 
distribution of funds and will require approval based on the MDA authority. The PEOs will be the decision 
authority for the programs where they are the MDA. Shyu, 2013 
PEO PEOs will delegate responsibility for data entry into the Army Will-cost/Should-cost database Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 1
PEO PEOs will be responsible for "verifying" data entered into the Will-cost/Should-cost database Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 4
PEO
PEOs will upload files to AKO folder by the 15th of every month so PARCA can review and upload to AKO by the 
30th of every month. This process will enable the Affordability IPT held at the PARCA to review most current will 
cost/should cost data floated up from the PMs/PEOs Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 9
PEO
PEOs have approval authority for ACAT Is and below and review and verification authority for ACAT I programs. 
Ms. Shyu has approval authority for ACAT Is, and override authority for ACAT Is and below. PARCA will review all 
initiatives, exemptions, and margin release to concur Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 10
PEO
Ensure the database has a hierarchy of all programs to effectively roll up initiative and exemption funding values 
to the PEO level. Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 20
PEO
PEOs will recertify exemption status quarterly. If any exemption information changes, the PEO/PM must notify 
PARCA within 30 days and must submit either a new exemption or initiative within 90 days if necessary Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 21
PEO
If any exemption information changes, the PEO/PM must notify PARCA within 30 days and must submit either a 
new exemption or initiative if necessary within 90 days. PARCA will inform Ms. Shyu of their status and provide 
any necessary instructions for moving forward. The 90 day clock for submitting changes for an exemption will 
begin once the PEO/PM identifies the change in the system. Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 22
PEO
For exemption and margin release approval (ACAT IIs and below), the approval authority (PEO) must print and 
sign the database generated form. The document must then be scanned and attached to the initiative in the 
database and the approver must update the status manually Shyu, 2013 - Business Rule 27
PEO
PEO shall validate a monthly report in the should cost database showing the amount of funds that have been 
released and the purpose of the release. A consolidated monthly report will be sent to the Principle Deputy and 
the AAE showing all programs margin with-hold and release Shyu, 2013 - Attachment 3
PEO
All ACAT II and III programs are required to develop and have independent verification of will cost estimates prior 
to milestone decisions. As with ACAT Is, the will cost estimate will be used as the basis for all budgeting and 
programming decision. All metrics and reporting external to the Department will be based on the will cost 
estimate. Shyu, 2011
PEO
All ACAT II and III programs will have MDA approved should cost execution targets. PEOs will have approval 
authority for the ACAT II programs delegated to them and ACAT III programs and will report annually on their 
progress to ASA(ALT). Shyu, 2011
PEO
PEOs and PMs of major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs)and major automated information system 
programs will report should cost targets and progress in achieving them at Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary (DAES) and DAB reviews. PEOs will provide, via the DAES briefings, quantitative metrics addressing how 
should cost has been implemented within their portfolios, incentive and recognition mechanisms in place, and 
lessons learned. PEOs will also provide case studies of should cost initiatives to the Defense Acquisition 
University for use in its training materials and BBP repository established to collect and share best practices.
Kendall, 2013 - Should Cost 




Table 8.   Official Should-Cost Guidance and Taskings for PMs 
Question 3: What are the best practices to promulgate to the acquisition 
workforce?  
A best practice is a method or process that produces superior results to those 
achieved with other means. Best practices are collected by observing and analyzing highly 
performing practices. The practices are then shared and used by the rest of the organization 
or business field. However, best practices applied to one product may not work on a similar 
product because of context, leadership, economic conditions, and so forth.  
 The following best practices were identified by our research and should be 




Should-cost Guidance or Tasking Document Source
PM
PMs implement Should-cost management by identifying opportunities for savings and developing should-
cost estimates for their ACAT I, II, and III programs, NLT 1 Aug 2013. Should-cost targets will be broken out by 
appropriation type. Cost savings that span multiple years, when it is reported at the end of the year, it should 
be reported as still in progress. Shyu, 2013 
PM 
Will-cost and Should-cost estimates are required for all ACAT I, II, and III milestone reviews. All reviews must 
be vetted by a cross functional team to include cost, financial management and budget, contracting, 
engineering, logistics, and programming representatives. Shyu, 2013 - attachment #3
PM PMs with multiple active subprograms under one program, should have a baseline for each program Shyu, 2013 - Business Rules
PM
Beginning in 2014, should-cost management objectives will be included in acquisition managers employee 
contribution planning and the officer's major performance objectives. Shyu, 2013 
PM
Assist the development of Will-cost estimates through CAPE,  Independent Cost Estimates, Department of the 
Army Service Cost Position (ACP), or Program Office Estimates (POE). Shyu, 2013 
PM
Develop and have independent verification of will-cost estimates prior to milestone decisions for ACAT II and 
III programs. Shyu, 2013 
PM
Input should-cost initiatives, exemptions, and margin release into the PARCA should-cost database by 
October each year and updated on a quarterly basis or when changes occur. PEO responsible for verifying the 
data entered. Shyu, 2013 
PM
PMs shall input should-cost initiatives, exemptions, and margin release into the PARCA should-cost database 
by October each year and updated on a quarterly basis or when changes occur. If initiatives are captured as 
part of another effort such as Better Buying Power (BBP), value engineering change proposal (VECP) or Lean 
Six Sigma (LSS) then the user should indicated this where necessary. The PEO is responsible for verifying the 
data entered. Shyu, 2013 
PM
Request margin release from the PEO through PARCA for withhold funding once initiatives have been 
successful and realized savings have occurred. Margin release will be allocated to fulfill unfunded 
requirements, to accelerate acquisition, and to fund cost reduction. Shyu, 2013 
PM
PM are required to report on their should-cost targets and progress against those targets at Defense 
Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) and Defense Acquisition Boards for MDAP programs. PMs will include 
in the plans of action and milestones for major Should-cost initiatives and their annual savings projected and 
realized. Shyu, 2013 
PM
Provide Should-cost case studies to the PEO for submission to PARCA for review. PARCA will identify based on 
best practice, which case studies should be included in the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) repository. Shyu, 2013 
PM
Submit exemption requests to the PEO for programs that are not able to obtain Should-cost initiatives. There 
will be two categories that qualify a program for an exemption: If a program has less than 43M remaining per 
year or it is a joint program with another service as the executive agent. Shyu, 2013 
PM
PMs will recertify exemption status quarterly. If any exemption changes, the PEO/PM must notify PARCA 
within 30 days and must submit new exemption or initiative within 90 days if necessary. Shyu, 2013 - Business Rules
PM
Develop inventive plans for PMs to reinforce and reward commitment to the Will-Cost and Should-Cost 
management process. Carter, 2011a
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• Best Practice 1: Integrated Product Team - PM UAS effectively implemented 
SCM into each one of their IPTs to develop their cost-saving initiatives.  
Protocol Pillar: 
• Best Practice 2: PM UAS Should-Cost Methodology – PM UAS leadership 
developed and implemented a five-step process for SCM in their organization 
(Figure 28). This process has proven to be successful by providing a structure 
to their SCM program.  
SCM Initiatives Best Practices: 
• Best Practice 3: Reduce Recurring Manufacturing Costs – The Grey Eagle 
program successfully reduced recurring manufacturing costs in their LRIP III 
contract to realize $13.09 million in SCM savings and additional $9 million in 
cost avoidance.  
• Best Practice 4: Value Engineering Change Proposals (VECP) – PM UAS 
processed two VECPs which resulted in $2.3 million in SCM savings and an 
additional $10 million in cost avoidance. 
• Best Practice 5: Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) - The strategy gave 
PM UAS 8% SCM savings of its Fiscal Year 2009–2012 procurement funding 
of the OSRVT Rover transceiver. The strategy promotes real competition 
within a program creating opportunities to cut cost through competition and 
expansion of the supplier base. Encourage programs to conduct CBAs to 
determine if buying the data rights and using GFE strategies are worth the 
cost. 
• Best Practice 6: Leverage Cross-product/service technology - PM Grey Eagle 
and PM Shadow leveraged similar technology to achieve $20 million in SCM 
savings. The cross-product coordination also resulted in eliminating 
redundancy in control stations and will reduce sustainment costs across the 
life cycle 
• Best Practice 7: Multi-year Contracts - PM Cargo executed a firm fixed price 
(FFP), multi-year sole source contract to realize a cost savings of $932 million 
for FY 2013–2019. 
 100 
 
 Best Practice #1 - PM UAS Should-Cost Methodology Figure 28. 
B. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendations for Should-Cost Process Improvement 
We make the following recommendations pursuant to the results of this research: 
• Finding #1: Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture describes how members of an organization behave, their 
symbols, and other artifacts that are identifiable. According to Robbins and Judge (1998), 
“Organizational culture refers to a system of shared meaning that distinguishes the 
organization from other organizations” (p. 219). SCM has been implemented for three 
years now and is making its way into organizational culture. All ACAT I, II, and III 
programs have implemented should-cost-based management into their programs or have 
requested an exemption. All the necessary policies have been written and promulgated, 
leaders’ guidance and intent given, and the initial necessary training conducted. SCM has 
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been successfully implemented as a process but remains outside the culture. The gains 
made are fragile and could be reversed without continuous leadership emphasis.  
• Recommendation #1: Organizational Culture 
We recommend that acquisition leaders further develop SCM into their 
organizations’ culture. Organizational culture happens when a dominant perception takes 
hold and is adopted by a majority of the organization (Robins and Judge, 1998, p. 219). 
SCM is a paradigm shift in how the acquisition workforce has been doing business since 
the start of the GWOT. SCM must be adopted into the dominant culture of the 
organization for it to be successful in the long term. Organizational culture can be created 
in three ways, according to Robbins and Judge (1998):  
First, leaders hire and keep only employees who think and feel the 
same way they do. Second, they indoctrinate and socialize these 
employees to their way of thinking and feeling. And finally, the 
leader’s own behavior encourages employees to identify with them 
and internalize their beliefs, values, and assumptions. (p. 223) 
Acquisition leaders must take the lead to embed SCM into their organizations. 
The process is going to require leaders to be a visible role model, communicate their 
intent across the force, visibly reward the workforce for its efforts, insert SCM into 
documented policy and doctrine, and provide protective mechanisms for employees who 
make mistakes. SCM management has been implemented as a standard process but has 
yet to become culture. The idea of “doing more without more” is a difficult proposition to 
execute and will take strong leadership to accomplish. Culture takes time and dedicated 
leadership effort to create and hold. Figure 29 shows a way SCM could be included into 




 Culture Creation and Maintenance (from Bauer & Erdogan, 2009) Figure 29. 
• Finding #2: Should-Cost Management in Sustainment  
SCM currently only applies to all ACAT I, II, and III programs that are active A 
program is considered active until it reaches 90% delivered or 90% expended, or, in the 
case of information systems, until it reaches full operational capacity (FOC).The AAE 
has indicated that specific guidance for capturing will-cost/should-cost will be released in 
October 2013 for implementation in FY 2014.   
• Recommendation #2: Should-Cost Management in Sustainment 
We recommend that all ACAT programs, regardless of life-cycle stage, 
implement SCM. Establishing sustainment SCM should be a priority going forward in 
FY 2014. Operations and sustainment account for 60% or more of the total life-cycle cost 
of a program. Great efforts should be made to reduce costs in the phase given that the 
initiatives produce a positive net present value (NPV). Products in sustainment can yield 
should-cost savings through careful management and planning. For example, PM Soldier 
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Protective Equipment (SPE) was able to save $30,000 in FY 2011 and achieve a project 
savings of $1.9 million for FY 2012–2016 through a VECP on the Advanced Combat 
Helmet (ACH) helmet cover. The helmet cover had been in sustainment for several years 
prior to the VECP. A small design initiated by the PMO made the cover less expensive to 
manufacture. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) subsequently put the newly designed 
cover on contract to realize the savings. The success of the VECP was due in part to close 
coordination between the PMO engineers and DLA contracting.   
• Finding #3: Army Will-Cost/Should-Cost Database 
The Army’s Will-Cost/Should-Cost Database is a standalone Microsoft Access 
database expertly designed to provide all functionality required for personnel to develop, 
own, track, and report SCM initiatives. Each SCM initiative is developed in the database 
and tracked over time. When needed, the reports and slide presentations for SCM reviews 
are created with the click of a button. This design does not currently interact with any 
other acquisition platform, such as DAMIR, CBAR, and so forth, which could potentially 
require input of the same data multiple times across multiple systems.  
The Microsoft Access design allows updates to be made in the database at any 
location. The data is then exported as an XML file and sent via an email or SharePoint 
site to the managers of the main database at the Army’s PARCA office. The design of the 
database also incorporates a login and password function that identifies the user and 
allows that user to only see the program data for which he or she is authorized to see. 
• Recommendation #3: Army Will-Cost/Should-Cost Database 
The current design of the database meets the immediate needs for the SCM 
process as the Army continues to iron out the requirements for SCM. The database shows 
the Army’s desire for SCM to become a permanent fixture in the complete acquisition 
process. Upgrading the database to a web-based database that interacts with other 
acquisition platforms would reduce the redundancy of data input and help solidify SCM 
as a permanent process in Army program management.  
Additionally, the current design of the database only allows an individual to see 
the data of a program for which he is authorized to see; a characteristic of the database 
that is absolutely necessary. However, there could be a treasure-trove of lessons learned 
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that is being unintentionally hidden. The database allows a PM to input why a SCM 
initiative worked or did not work. These comments associated with the initiative are 
exactly the information that should be circulated across the entire PM and PEO 
community to assist with cost saving measures. Tucking this golden nugget of 
information in an area that only the originator can see, slows down the acquisition 
community’s ability to learn from each other’s SCM initiative efforts.  
• Finding #4: Should-Cost Management Best Practice Sharing  
 Currently, the DAU offers PMT 401 and PMT 402 courses to selected 
PEOs, DPEOs, PMs, and DPMs on Fort Belvoir, VA prior to them assuming their posts. 
During these courses, SCM best practices are shared and discussed in a classroom 
environment. These courses are largely reserved for senior level acquisition leaders (O-
5/GS 14 and above), however; classes are available to military and civilian acquisition 
professionals in the rank of Major (O-4) and General Schedule (GS) 13s and below, on a 
case by case basis depending on availability of seats. Additionally, our research 
uncovered a DoD-managed website (DoD, n.d.) that contains a repository of SCM best 
practices and case studies that can be accessed via Common Access Cards (CAC) and is 
currently restricted to personnel designated by the CAEs. According to the website (DoD, 
n.d.), AT&L Government personnel wishing to access this website may check back in the 
website in mid-November 2013 for an update on this access policy.  
• Recommendation #4: Should-Cost Management Best Practice Sharing  
 Currently, some SCM best practices are shared among senior leaders 
(lieutenant colonel [O-5] / GS 14 and above) during their attendance at the DAU’s PMT 
401 and PMT 402 courses prior to taking PEO, DPEO, PM, or DPM positions. While we 
believe this to be an effective method and agree that it makes sense to target senior 
leaders who have been selected to lead programs to teach these courses; it would be 
beneficial to open up the aperture and provide SCM education to all ranks and experience 
levels within the acquisition workforce. 
 SCM should be emphasized at all levels of the acquisition workforce, from 
top level executives at OSD to the Assistant Product Manager (APM) and his or her 
product team working the program every single day. Personnel at different levels of the 
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SCM chain have varying perspectives on how to gain efficiencies in a program. 
Successfully merging these perspectives will allow the acquisition workforce to gain 
continual improvement in the SCM process.  
• Finding #5: SCM Permanency  
 Currently, SCM initiatives are being tracked, monitored, and reported at 
all levels from the PM to the USD(AT&L). Our research shows that SCM is continuing 
to gain traction and greater importance in an environment of shrinking defense budgets 
primarily due to leadership emphasis. There is a need to make SCM a permanent fixture 
to all acquisition processes and documents other than leadership strictly enforcing SCM 
into the programs.  
• Recommendation #5: SCM Permanency  
We recommend that the SCM process be incorporated into all key process 
documents, charts, and acquisition platforms, such as the Integrated Acquisition 
Lifecycle Chart, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, DoD 5000.02, AR 70-1, and the 
DAMIR and CBAR platforms. Every effort should be made to make SCM an automatic 
process in managing a program and habitual in execution.  
C. AREAS FOR ADDITIONAL RESEARCH 
This case study is foundational and exploratory in nature and is intended to provide 
valuable feedback to DoD leaders and the acquisition workforce in regard to how the Army 
has implemented SCM. In order to leverage the work we have done with this case study, 
additional research based on our findings will provide more fidelity into the effectiveness of 
the SCM program. We recommend further research into the following areas:  
• Conduct further research on the impact of Continuing Resolutions (CR) on the 
Army’s ability to manage programs to their should-cost targets. With the 
uncertain budgetary environment the Army has been operating in for the past 
five years – living CR to the next CR – there are vast implications for SCM 
execution in the years to come. 
• Conduct additional case studies to identify and promulgate SCM best 
practices. Our case study is a small sampling of SCM practices. The SCM 
program is gaining traction, and there will be more opportunities to collect 
SCM best practices and share them with the workforce.  
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• Conduct further research to determine what impact(s) will-cost estimates have 
on the PM’s ability to achieve the most amount of savings using SCM. 
According to Shyu, PMs are encouraged to track all interim changes to make 
sure the assumptions made to come up with the will-cost baseline are still 
valid when addressing potential SCM initiative savings. The accuracy of the 
will-cost estimate could be directly related to the amount of savings achieved 
in an SCM initiative.  
• Determine how the DCMA and DCAA are supporting the SCM effort through 
a detailed case study. Our research showed that the DCMA coordinated with 
the Navy Price Fighters to help PM Cargo obtain accurate cost data. 
Additionally, Yoder (2012) wrote in his thesis about the support both 
organizations are providing to support the BBPi, but little has been written 
about their efforts in supporting SCM. 
D. FINAL THOUGHTS/CONCLUSION 
As the DoD continues into an age of shrinking budgets, the Army’s acquisition 
workforce will have to figure out how to continually modernize the force with fewer 
resources. The SCM process is an exceptional tool that has been a part of the acquisition 
manager’s kit bag, but not utilized as efficiently as it could have While the country being 
engaged in two conflicts over a 10-year period contributed to constant acquisition 
program overruns, Carter brought SCM to the forefront to correct what had become the 
historical norm. The SCM process forces managers to become cost conscious in 
acquisitions processes, something that is too easily dismissed when the primary mission 
is to get the needed materials into the warfighters’ hands so they can be successful in 
their mission.  
The SCM process is vital and necessary in today’s Army to help provide the best 
equipment to the Soldier at the best price. The current implementation of SCM in the 
Army is heavily reliant on leadership to keep it alive, although there have been 
significant steps taken that signal a desire to make it a permanent fixture in the 
acquisition processes. Including the SCM process into all acquisition documents and 
process charts will help to solidify its permanence and allow many programs, which 
might have otherwise been canceled due to cost overruns, to end up in the warfighters’ 
hands.  
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